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Should the United States continue to enter into free trade
agreements containing sovereign commitments to resolve
regulatory disputes with qualifying multinational corporations
before international arbitral tribunals? This question has gained
public prominence due to the vocal opposition of Senator
Elizabeth Warren and President Donald Trump to the Trans-
Pacific Partnership (TPP), denouncing it as disastrous and
corrupt.' Public outcry has focused in particular on the investor-
state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanism included in the
treaty. Public criticism submits that ISDS suffers from a fatal
systemic asymmetry-it favors the profit interests of
multinationals over the public policy concerns of the host states
in which these multinationals invest.
As this Article demonstrates, existing academic literature on
ISDS tends to confirm this asymmetry. The prevalent ISDS
literature is descriptively incorrect in this regard. This oversight
is caused by a significant blind spot in the ISDS research
perspective: the literature focuses exclusively on the expectation
interests of multinationals arising out of investment
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155
VANDERBIL T]OURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW
transactions. This Article demonstrates that this focus is
descriptively untenable.
This Article proposes an alternative to the expectation
interest model prevalent in the current literature: ISDS does not
focus upon investor expectancy, as currently theorized, but
protects the reciprocal reliance interests of states as well as
multinational investors. An ISDS process focused on the reliance
interests of states and non-state actors imposes meaningful
obligations on all parties to investment transactions. These
obligations are part of a legal process mediating between state-to-
state international law and commercial transnational law
norms. By protecting the reciprocal reliance interests of states
and multinationals, ISDS emerges as a constitutive component
of the success of global public-private cooperation. This change
in perspective demonstrates how ISDS can assist both states and
multinationals in harnessing market mechanisms to achieve
development policy goals.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Oh and while the king was looking down
The jester stole his thorny crown
The courtroom was adjourned
No verdict was returned.
-Don McLean, American Pie.2
Is it prudent and sustainable to privatize the global governance of
international investment flows? Today's legal infrastructure relies
significantly on investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS)-a network
of international arbitral tribunals sitting ad hoc-to fulfill just this
task.3 Currently, the amount in controversy involved in pending ISDS
claims between states and multinationals exceeds half a trillion dollars
($595.5 billion). 4 These ISDS tribunals are empowered either under
privately negotiated investment contracts between multinationals and
the host states to their investment or by consent of the host state to the
investment in vaguely worded international investment treaties or
domestic investment laws.5 In either case, ISDS tribunals are not
subject to broad governmental or international oversight.6 Given the
ubiquity of contract, treaty, and legislative consents to ISDS,
2. DON McLEAN, American Pie, on AMERICAN PIE (United Artists 1971).
3. See Paul B. Stephan, Privatizing International Law, 97 VA. L. REV. 1573,
1610 (2011) (discussing the role of investment arbitral tribunals in global governance).
4. Michael Goldhaber et al., 2015 Arbitration Scorecard, AM. LAW. INT'L (July
1, 2015), http://www.international.law.com/id=1202731137443/2015-Arbitration-
Scorecard-Contract-and-Treaty-Disputes?slreturn=20151108120650 [https:/perma.cc/
NXE7-E5XQ] (archived Oct. 26, 2016) (reporting an amount in controversy of $410.85
billion for treaty disputes pending on July 1, 2015 and an amount in controversy of
$184.65 billion for contract claims between investors and state-owned companies
brought pursuant to contract in the same period).
5. See JESWALD SALACUSE, THE THREE LAWS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT:
NATIONAL, CONTRACTUAL, AND INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORKS FOR FOREIGN CAPITAL 3-4
(2013).
6. Eloise Obadia & Frauke Nitschke, Institutional Arbitration and the Role of
the Secretariat, in LITIGATING INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT DISPUTES 80, 123 (Chiara
Giorgetti ed., 2014) (discussing institutional oversight).
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transactions subject to ultimate ISDS review are worth trillions of
dollars.7
The question of whether such a large role for ISDS makes for good
policy has acute political significance. The United States entered into
an international treaty with eleven Pacific Rim nations, known as the
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), on October 5, 2015.8 The treaty has
been decried as "insanity" and "rigged" by President Donald Trump
and Democratic Senator Elizabeth Warren, respectively.9 The issue
drawing the most pitched opposition-the one clause "everyone should
oppose"-is the ISDS provision of the treaty. o
Part of the current academic response to public criticism of ISDS
mechanisms is quantitative." This quantitative response submits that
the outcomes of ISDS proceedings do not support the claim that ISDS
is "rigged" because states incur liability in only a reasonable number
of disputes and, in those instances, recovery is typically significantly
less than originally requested by the investor.12 This analysis proves,
in a sophisticated manner, that there is no overt bias against states
when international tribunals determine governmental liability.' 3 It
concludes definitively that, while there is room for ISDS reform, there
is no need categorically to question its fairness.14
But the quantitative responses given so far allow for a potential
rejoinder: the scholarship focuses upon ISDS state loss rates. It does
not address the possibility for states' recovery of damages from
multinational investors in ISDS for investor misconduct.'5 This focus
is consistent with the conventional wisdom in qualitative ISDS
7. See Charles Brower & Sadie Blanchard, What's in a Meme? The Truth About
Investor-State Arbitration: Why It Need Not, and Must Not, Be Repossessed by States, 52
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 689, 778 (2014) (noting the existence of "over 3,000 bilateral
investment treaties and additional regional trade agreement with investment
chapters").
8. See Jackie Calmes, Trans-Pacific Partnership Is Reached, But Faces Scrutiny
in Congress, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/06/business/
trans-pacific-partnership-trade-deal-is-reached.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/6EL9-
6ESF] (archived Oct. 15, 2016) (reporting signature of the agreement and next steps to
ratification in the United States).
9. See Dan Merica & Eric Bradner, Hillary Clinton Comes out Against TPP
Trade Deal, CNN (Oct. 7, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/10/07/politics/hillary-clinton-
opposes-tpp/index.html [https://perma.cc/2EN5-LBK5] (archived Oct. 1, 2016) (reporting
Hillary Clinton's opposition); Boyle, supra note 1; Warren, supra note 1.
10. See Warren, supra note 1.
11. See Susan D. Franck & Lindsey E. Wylie, Predicting Outcomes in Investment
Treaty Arbitration, 65 DUKE L.J. 459, 520-21 (2015) (defending liability decisions
against states from a quantitative point of view).
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See id. at 489-90 (referring to the 60 percent of cases in which "respondent
won" as "no state liability").
15. See George Kahale III, Remarks, in 8 INVESTMENT ARBITRATION AND




scholarship: states bargain away legal protection to investors in
exchange for the expectation of increased future foreign investment
flows. 16 States do not bargain with investors to gain legal protection
through ISDS themselves." This conventional wisdom sets up the
problem identified by ISDS critics-that ISDS, in fact, appears to be
completely one-sided, favoring investor rights to the exclusion of state
rights. 1
Part II will explain that this rejoinder fails because the ISDS
literature is descriptively incomplete. The ISDS literature so far does
not account for the habitual and significant counterclaims raised by
states and state entities in both treaty and contract arbitrations.'9 The
recent landmark decision in Perenco v. Ecuador, permitting
counterclaims in a treaty arbitration to proceed for a failure by the
investment vehicle to act "as a responsible environmental steward" in
the host state, is only the most recent-and most visible-example of
this facet of ISDS.20 The literature so far thus fails to fully explain the
scope and nature of ISDS.
Part II submits that much of the qualitative ISDS literature is
self-defeating because it looks to answer the wrong question.2 1 The
literature accepts that states bargain away ISDS protections in
exchange for the prospect of investment,22 and then seeks to define the
scope of protection by reference to investor expectancy-what benefit
of the bargain must states provide to investors to attract investment?
Such expectancy measures whether the "breach of the [state's] promise
causes [the investor] to feel that [the investor] has been 'deprived' of
something which was [the investor's own]. "23 The, dominant
approaches simply diverge on the narrower question of whether
expectancy should be defined by reference to the commercial law
perspective of the investor,24 the administrative law perspective of the
16. See Jeswald Salacuse & Nicholas Sullivan, Do BITs Work? An Evaluation of
Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain, 46 HARV. INT'L L.J. 67, 77 (2005)
(arguing that the grand bargain of the current regime is "a promise of protection of
capital in return for the prospect of more capital in the future") (emphasis in original).
17. See id.
18. See Warren, supra note 1.
19. See, e.g., Goldhaber et al., supra note 4.
20. Perenco Ecuador Ltd. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/6,
Environmental Counterclaim, 1 447 (Aug. 11, 2015), IIC 699 (2015).
21. See CHRISTOPHER DUGAN ET AL., INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION 153-54
(2008); Franck & Wylie, supra note 11, at 520-21 (focusing upon liability decisions
against states).
22. See, e.g., Richard C. Chen, A Contractual Approach to Investor-State
Regulatory Disputes, 40 YALE J. INT'L L. 295, 302 (2015); Barnali Choudhury,
International Investment Law as Public Good, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 481, 495 (2013);
Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 16, at 77 (quoted above).
23. Lon Fuller & William Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46
YALE L.J. 52, 57 (1936).
24. See Julian Cardenas Garcia, The Era of Petroleum Arbitration Mega Cases,
35 Hous. J. INT'L L. 537, 579 (2013) (submitting that investment treaty arbitration fits
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domestic regulator,25 or the treaty law perspective of the host state.26
As Part II concludes, each of these approaches logically becomes self-
defeating because commercial expectancy is an inapposite measure for
the legitimacy of regulatory (i.e., non-commercial) state conduct and
vice versa.
Part III submits that the descriptive problems in the current
literature can be overcome by more careful empirical analysis of the
ISDS process." How do ISDS tribunals arrive at decisions? Part III
proposes that the ISDS process does not concern investor expectancy
but rather concerns the protection of reciprocal reliance interests of the
state and the foreign investor. In the context of long-term transactions,
these reliance interests are necessarily reciprocal-each party
constantly changes its position because of, and in response to, the
conduct of the other (e.g., the investor commits money in response to
regulatory approvals of a new turbine for a power plant, the state
adjusts its plans for electricity generation because the investor
promises to operate the turbine by a certain date, and so on).
Part III proposes that, by switching to a reliance perspective,
ISDS can balance otherwise incommensurable interests of state,
regulatory, and private actors.28 Part III explains that, if this
hypothesis is correct, ISDS would form part of a new, supernational
law between classic international law, transnational law, and global
administrative law.2 9 This super-national law would do more than
traditionally theorized supra-national aw-a term that refers to "legal
rules and procedures that are authoritatively interpreted by
institutions existing outside of the legal and political structures of the
sovereign states that establish those institutions."o3 Rather than refer
to a set of rules and procedures for their interpretation beyond the
realm of the sovereign to which these rules are applied, supernational
law theorizes the common logic or process of their application. This
supernational law incorporates transnational commercial, global
with a "broad philosophical approach to transnational law" and "its own concept of
transnational legal order for arbitration").
25. See generally SANTIAGO MONTT, STATE LIABILITY IN INVESTMENT
ARBITRATION 310 (2012).
26. See Anthea Roberts, Triangular Treaties: The Extent and Limits of
Investment Treaty Rights, 56 HARV. INT'L L.J. 353, 416 (2015) (proposing a treaty law
based resolution) [hereinafter Roberts 2015].
27. See FREDERIC SOURGENS, A NASCENT COMMON LAW 244 (2015).
28. See HAROLD LASSWELL & MYRES MCDOUGAL, JURISPRUDENCE FOR A FREE
SOCIETY 99 (1992) (clarifying the need for a process-based theory that permitted
harmonization of "the conflicting interests in a community into perspectives of common
interest, balancing the effective power of different classes and interests" that a more
accurate theory about law is feasible).
29. The Article coins the phrase supernational law to denote a law above
municipal law that is not "inter"-national in the sense of being between states or
transnational as in the sense of affecting all cross-border transactions.
30. Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Legal Integration of NAFTA Through
Supranational Adjudication, 43 TEX. INT'L L.J. 349, 349 (2008).
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administrative, and/or public international law norms as reference
points to assess the reasonableness of reliance interests of each ISDS
participant in turn, without subjecting the reasonableness of the other
ISDS participants to that framework as a predicate for liability. Like
the transactions giving rise to it, the ISDS process would then reflect
and take seriously the interpenetrating interests of corporate profit
and political commonweal that facilitate global investment flows in the
first place.3 '
Part IV tests the supernational law hypothesis developed in Part
III against ISDS state liability determinations. It begins this analysis
with a question about the ISDS process itself: How can states incur
binding obligations to arbitrate with non-state actors, at all? As Part
IV explains, the drafters of the original ISDS framework convention
instructively answered this question: ISDS consents are "unilateral
acts" under international law.3 2 This framework is in fact reflected in
arbitral jurisprudence.3 3
The unilateral act framework has consequences for the
substantive protections extended by states together with the ISDS
consent. These protections are also unilateral acts. Significantly, for
the supernational law hypothesis, unilateral acts protect the
reasonable reliance interests of intended beneficiaries by operation of
international principles of good faith.34 Unilateral act analysis
requires tribunals to employ a highly context-sensitive balancing test,
taking into account the circumstances surrounding the making of the
act and its likely reception by intended beneficiaries.3 5 Part IV
concludes that ISDS jurisprudence is reasonably faithful to the
requirements of the context-sensitive balancing approach laid down by
international law on unilateral acts, thus confirming the supernational
law hypothesis.
Part V next tests the supernational law hypothesis against ISDS
claims prosecuted by states. It begins its analysis by asking a second
question about the ISDS process: How can commercial parties incur
binding obligations to arbitrate statutory or tort-based counterclaims
31. See LASSWELL & McDOUGAL, supra note 28, at 143 (discussing the
interdetermination, interdependence, interstimulation, and interpenetration of global
communities)
32. See Aron Broches, Note Transmitted to the Executive Director, in 2 HISTORY
OF ICSID CONVENTION 5 (1968).
33. See generally David D. Caron, The Interpretation of National Foreign
Investment Laws as Unilateral Acts Under International Law, in LOOKING TO THE
FUTURE: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HONOR OF W. MICHAEL REISMAN 649-74
(Mahnoush Arsanjani et al. eds., 2011); W. Michael Reisman & Mahnoush Arsanjani,
The Question of Unilateral Governmental Statements as Applicable Law in Investment
Disputes, in VOLKERRECHT ALS WERTORDNUNG - COMMON VALUES IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 409 (Pierre Dupuy et al. eds., 2006).
34. See Caron, supra note 33, at 654 ("[T]he ICJ linked the legal effects connected
to unilateral declarations to the principle of good faith.").
35. See id.
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like the ones states are likely to pursue against an investor? Part V
explains that such claims are possible to the extent that commercial
parties agree upon broadly worded arbitration clauses. This
commercial approach has been adopted by ISDS jurisprudence.36
Part V continues with the question of what law is applicable to the
substance of state claims against investors. Again drawing on
jurisprudence, Part V establishes that arbitral tribunals look to
principles of transnational good faith.3 7 Transnational good faith, like
unilateral act liability, also protects reliance interests, in this case, the
reliance interest a state can place in its commercial counterparty.3 8
Consistent with jurisprudence, principles of transnational aw impose
obligations on commercial parties to act reasonably and with due
regard for the interests of their counterparties, even in the absence of
contractual language to that effect.39 Part V concludes that, by
implication, such principles should be available, even in the context of
treaty arbitration commenced by investors, and even if the treaty does
not speak to questions of investor liability. Part V thus confirms the
supernational law hypothesis in the context of state ISDS
counterclaims.
Part VI then combines both elements of supernational law-
unilateral act state liability and transnational investor liability-into
a single process of decision. It showcases how ISDS reflects the
reciprocal reliance interests of investors and states that are inherent
in investment transactions. It thus overcomes the apparent asymmetry
implicit in the current ISDS literature.
Part VII concludes with an appraisal of the value of such a
supernational law and directly addresses the policy challenge raised
by TPP critics.40 It explains that the conception of ISDS developed in
this Article supports the idea that existing ISDS mechanisms are both
prudent and sustainable for three reasons. First, ISDS depoliticizes
36. See Paushok v. Government of Mong., Award, Award on Jurisdiction and
Liability, 1 689 (Apr. 28, 2011), IIC 490 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2011); Saluka Investments BV
v. Czech, Decision on Jurisdiction over the Czech Republic's Counterclaim, ¶¶ 21, 39
(May 7, 2004), IIC 209 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2004).
37. See Inceysa Vallisolente SL v. El Sal., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/26, Award,
11 229-39 (Aug. 2, 2006), IIC 234 (2006).
38. See KLAUS-PETER BERGER, THE CREEPING CODIFICATION OF THE LEX
MERCATORIA 81-82 (2010) (discussing the role of the arbitrator in transnational aw).
39. See id. at 122, 142, 385 ("Each party has a good faith obligation to renegotiate
the contract if there is a need to adapt the contract to changed circumstances and the
continuation of performance can reasonably be expected from the parties.").
40. See Roberts 2015, supra note 26, at 389-94 (discussing the consequences of
depoliticization); Andrea Bjorklund et al., An Open Letter About Investor-State Dispute
Settlement (April 2015), McGILL (Apr. 20, 2015), https://www.mcgill.ca/fortier-chair/isds-
open-letter [https://perma.cc/2QVV-QVGW] (archived Oct. 1, 2016) (the author is a
signatory of the letter). For a cogent critique of depoliticization being used too loosely in
current literature on investor-state dispute resolution, see Martins Paparinskis,
International Investment Law and the European Union: A Reply to Catharine Titi, 26
EUR. J. INT'L L. 663, 664 (2015).
[VOL. 50:155
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investment disputes.41 Rather than yielding to coercion or corruption
or influence or innuendo, ISDS looks to a legal process agreed to by all
agents and actors involved.42 It thus provides a mechanism to make
effective the ex ante expectations of all participants in an investment
relationship reflected in the underlying investment documents.4 3
Second, by focusing on reliance interests, ISDS nevertheless remains
policy-sensitive. Rather than yielding to purportedly apolitical rules,
ISDS decision making is conscious of the policy implications of each
actor's choices in arriving at an outcome.44 It thus bestows authority
upon legal decisions by rooting decisions in the respective community
expectations of all participants in an investment relationship.4 5 Third,
ISDS stabilizes investment flows.4 6 Rather than conceding to the
inevitability of political risk, ISDS renders transparent the types of
interests and the balance that will be brought to bear in the
apportionment of future benefits and burdens flowing from the
investment relationship.4 7
II. APPRAISING THE DOMINANT APPROACHES
Part II outlines and appraises the dominant approaches to ISDS.
Section A below introduces the three dominant rival approaches to
ISDS.48 These approaches are that ISDS forms part of a transnational
legal order, is a starting point for global administrative law, or is a
41. See Bjorklund et al., supra note 40.
42. See id.
43. See generally W. MICHAEL REISMAN, THE QUEST FOR WORLD ORDER AND
HUMAN DIGNITY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 95-104 (2012) (discussing the
distinction between operational code and myth systems).
44. LASSWELL & McDOUGAL, supra note 28, at 105 (unmasking the "widespread
illusion[] that legislation is something 'political' and not 'legal' and that the principal
concern of law is largely with the application of law") (emphasis in original).
45. See id. at 63 n.1 (defining authority as concordance with "expectations of
members of a community what will be decided"). These expectations give rise to
reasonable reliance, as opposed to an "expectation interest" in that they provide the
predicate when a person is reasonably induced to change position to his or her detriment.
See Fuller & Perdue, supra note 23, at 53-55 (defining reliance and expectation interests
vis-d-vis community expectations).
46. See LASSWELL & MCDOUGAL, supra note 28, at 147 (global processes of
effective power can "establish] and maintain[] constitutive processes of authoritative
power for the promotion and stabilization of more economic and human social routines").
47. See John Linarelli, Analytical Jurisprudence and the Concept of Commercial
Law, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 119, 165-69 (2009) (discussing the role of transnational aw
in allocating risk in general in the construction context); see also Michael Nolan, Frdd6ric
G. Sourgens & Mark Rockefeller, Political Risk Insurance and Guarantees from Public
Providers, in TRANSNATIONAL LAW OF PUBLIC CONTRACTS 737-71 (Stephan Schill &
Matthias Audit eds., 2016) (discussing mechanisms for obtaining political risk coverage
for parties to whom political risk is allocated in transnational transactions).
48. See Stephan W. Schill, W(h)ither Fragmentation? On the Literature and
Sociology of International Investment Law, 22 EUR. J. INT'L L. 875, 877-78 (2011)
(discussing public international law, international commercial, and international public
law discourses).
20171 163
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treaty-based mechanism to address state investment policy needs.
Section B outlines the descriptive flaws of these approaches.
A. The Dominant Approaches
1. The Transnational Legal Order Perspective
The first view holding significant currency in the ISDS literature
is that investment protection forms part of a broader transnational
legal order.4 9 The transnational perspective is fundamentally
commercial in outlook and conceptualizes the relationship between the
investment and the state principally from the perspective of the
investor.5 0 As discussed below, the transnational egal order has three
constitutive elements: (1) the order applies to cross-border transactions
involving a non-state actor, (2) the applicable law to those transactions
is independent from the law of any one state, and (3) the applicable law
is enforced in a forum that is similarly independent from any one
jurisdiction. To function properly, this perspective requires an
arbitration mechanism that is fully autonomous from any one
jurisdiction-most centrally, the jurisdictions of the disputing parties.
Judge Philip C. Jessup introduced the concept of transnational
law in 1956.51 By the end of World War II, commercial cross-border
transactions had significantly increased in number, size, and
complexity, requiring a new form of law to address this bustling field
of commercial endeavor.52 Transnational aw thus captures more than
the law of state-to-state interaction, namely, all types of cross-border
relationships beyond the state-to-state relationships covered by public
international law.53 Although there are varying definitions of
transnational law, all agree that the scope of transnational law
49. See Jeswald Salacuse, Making Transnational Law Work Through Regime-
Building: The Case of International Investment Law, in MAKING TRANSNATIONAL LAW
WORK IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF DETLEV VAGTS 406, 407 (Pieter
Bekker et al. eds., 2010) (submitting that international investment law is "a vitally
important part of transnational aw"). For recent literature adopting an approach related
to the transnational egal order discussed below, see Brower & Blanchard, supra note 7
passim (arguing for a transnational egal approach to investment arbitration).
50. See supra text accompanying note 47.
51. See PHILIP C. JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW 2 (1956).
52. See GRALF-PETER CALLIESS & PEER ZUMBANSEN, ROUGH CONENSUS AND
RUNNING CODE: A THEORY OF TRANSNATIONAL PRIVATE LAW 11-26 (2010) (discussing
the global reception of Jessup's 1956 transnational law proposal); Donald E. Childress
III, Rethinking Legal Globalization: The Case of Transnational Personal Jurisdiction, 54
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1489, 1500-06 (2013) (discussing the origin and U.S. reception of
Jessup's 1956 transnational aw proposal).
53. Childress, supra note 52, at 1500; see also Math Noortmann, Transnational
Law: Philip Jessup's Legacy and Beyond, in NON-STATE ACTORS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW




includes all interactions involving non-state actors.54 This could refer
to purely commercial relationships or to relationships that involve
state or state-controlled entities, as well as commercial
counterparties.55
Following the original proposal of transnational law by Jessup,
scholarship on transnational law was mainly developed in Europe.56
French scholars in particular posited the existence of a distinct
transnational legal "order," coequal to, and independent from,
municipal law and public international law.57 This transnational egal
order centrally rejects that all cross-border transactions must be
subject to the laws of a state.58 Classic legal doctrine, rejected by these
transnationalists, provides that conflicts-of-law principles will
ultimately determine the applicable law to any such cross-border
transaction, even in the face of a choice-of-law clause.59
Transnationalists argue instead that commercial practice supports the
opposite conclusion: that cross-border transactions are governed by
legal rules sourced from relevant industry practice, industry self-
regulation, and the establishment of general principles of commercial
law shared by the actors relevant to the transaction.60 By severing the
link to municipal law, transnationalists submit that the transnational
legal order is truly, substantively autonomous from states.
61
Finally, the transnationalists submit that the autonomous
transnational rules applied to cross-border transactions are enforced
in a truly international forum: international arbitration.62 They thus
submit that international arbitration is a means of enforcing
delocalized legal rules that are themselves not anchored in a municipal
system.63 Instead, they argue that the widespread accession to
international treaties requiring the enforcement of arbitration clauses
and awards means that current practice has established a fully
54. See, e.g., Childress, supra note 52, at 1500. -
55. See Andreas Maurer, The Concept of Participation in the Making of
Transnational Law: Legitimization and Normaxtivity in the Transnational Sphere, in
REGULATORY HYBRIDIZATION IN THE TRANSNATIONAL SPHERE 203, 205-06 (Paulius
Jurcys et al. eds., 2013).
56. Compare Childress, supra note 52, at 1500-05 (noting that transnational aw
in the U.S. laid dormant until the 1980s), with Gilles Cuniberti, Three Theories of Lex
Mercatoria, 52 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 369, 378-79 (2014) (outlining Berhold
Goldman's contribution to transnational legal order scholarship in the 1960s).
57. See Maurer, supra note 55, at 203, 205 (discussing Goldman's contribution
on transnational legal orders as borrowing from and developing Jessup).
58. See Cuniberti, supra note 56, at 378-79.
59. See BERGER, supra note 38, at 23-26.
60. See id. at 289-92.
61. See Cuniberti, supra note 56, at 378-79.
62. See EMMANUEL GAILLARD, ASPECTS PHILOSOPHIQUES DU DROIT DE
LARBITRAGE INTERNATIONAL 66 (2008) (positing the necessity of an arbitral order
autonomous from the municipal legal order).
63. See id. at 193 (discussing enforcement at the seat of arbitration and outside
of the seat of the arbitration).
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autonomous forum in which disputes arising out of cross-border
transactions can be resolved.64
Proponents of the classic transnational legal order submit that
transnational law operates according to basic principles.6 5 They thus
theorize a system of law that, in one form or another, can be made
applicable to a transnational legal problem.66 Transnationalists also
work on the codification of such principles in various forms in order to
lend greater certainty to commercial actors and international
arbitrators.67
The existence of a transnational egal order is itself contentious.68
Outside of the investment context, the view that arbitration is a truly
autonomous enforcement mechanism has come under scrutiny by
commentators from England and Wales, as well as the United States.69
Without an autonomous enforcement mechanism, it would become
increasingly difficult to theorize that the substantive rules applied to
the dispute are themselves delocalized (as they remain subject to
review of one sort or another by an enforcing local court).7 0 This review
would become particularly salient if commercial parties sought to
contract around the applicable mandatory rules of the laws of the state
most directly affected by the transaction.7 1 Although much of that
debate is beyond the purview of the current Article, it suffices to say
that, as a matter of practice, a significant number of arbitral tribunals
in fact apply transnational rules to their ultimate decisions, and a
great many enforcing jurisdictions habitually give great deference to
the substantive reasoning of commercial arbitrators, be it in the set-
aside or the enforcement context.72
64. See BERGER, supra note 38, at 289-92.
65. See id. at 282-83; see also Bryan H. Druzin, Anarchy, Order, and Trade: A
Structuralist Account of Why a Global Commercial Legal Order Is Emerging, 47 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1049, 1051 (2014) ("This transnational legal order represents a rich
and growing body of jurisprudence functioning under dispute settlement mechanisms
that boast principles and rules that are no longer restricted to specific spheres of
influence but actually entail elements of integration as trade law is being partly or fully
harmonized.").
66. See Linarelli, supra note 47, at 206 (discussing gap filling in the
transnational commercial context).
67. See BERGER, supra note 38, at 255-70 (discussing codification approaches).
68. Frbdric Bachand, Court Intervention in International Arbitration: The Case
for Compulsory Judicial Intervention, 2012 J. DISP. RESOL. 83, 85 (2012).
69. See NIGEL BLACKABY ET AL., REDFERN AND HUNTER ON INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION 592 (2015) (outlining the spectrum of legal systems including England and
the United States in permitting review of arbitral awards for mistake of law).
70. See GAILLARD, supra note 62, at 193 (describing the link between autonomy
and enforcement).
71. See BLACKABY ET AL., supra note 69, at 590 (analyzing set-aside in the
context of mandatory rules).
72. See Fredbric G. Sourgens, Comparative Law as Rhetoric: An Analysis of the
Use of Comparative Law in International Arbitration, 8 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 1, 18
(2007) (stating that the "art of using legal comparison to create a common normative
language for the dispute ... is an inherently case-driven exercise").
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Transnationalists theorize that investment arbitration falls
within the general scope of their project. Centrally, transnationalists
seize upon the arbitration mechanism.73 The principal investor-state
arbitral institution is the World Bank International Center for the
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). This forum was intended
to make available a truly delocalized dispute resolution process.74
Other investor-state arbitrations proceed pursuant to the New York
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards, a
core instrument of transnational legal scholarship in the commercial
setting.7 5 Investor-state tribunals operating in this context have
refused to yield to state attempts at controlling their own jurisdiction
over the dispute.7 6 Any such delocalized process effectively supports a
transnational process in that it is not subject to municipal legal
supervision and does not limit recourse to state actors.
Substantively, transnationalists submit that it is reasonably
intuitive that the law applicable to foreign investment protection
disputes should not exclusively be the law of any one state.77 At the
very least, the principle that the host state has to fulfill its contractual
promises cannot be subject to host state law. 7 If it were, the promise
would be meaningless, as the state could escape its own obligations by
legislative fiat.79 Similarly, as the host state would be unlikely to agree
to a choice of a municipal law other than its own, the choice of law,
even in contractual arbitration, has typically been some form of general
principles of law.80 These general principles make applicable the same
transnational commercial law crystallized in international commercial
arbitral jurisprudence.8 ' In short, transnationalists argue that a state
obligates itself to act as a reasonable and diligent commercial actor
towards the investor and thus provides legal certainty to that investor
that the investment will not be unfairly or arbitrarily impaired for
political reasons.
73. See Ole Spiermann, Applicable Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 89, 93 (Peter Muchlinski et al. eds., 2008) ("[T]he
choice of international arbitration was seen by many as a reason in itself for
internationalizing applicable law.").
74. See CHRISTOPH SCHREUER ET AL., THE ICSID CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY
899 (2009) ("[D]omestic courts have no power of review over ICSID awards.").
75. See generally Brower & Blanchard, supra note 7 passim (arguing against
greater state influence over the investor-state arbitral mechanism).
76. See GAILLARD, supra note 62, at 193 (discussing the link between autonomy
and enforcement).
77. See Spiermann, supra note 73, at 92-96 (discussing the development of the
pacta sunt servanda internationalization of investment contracts).
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. See id. at 101 (noting that general principles of law will automatically be
applied by an arbitral tribunal in investment disputes even in the absence of a choice of
law clause to that effect).
81. See id.
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Transnationalists point to the recent arbitral award in Occidental
v. Ecuador as a paradigmatic case for their perspective.8 2 The case
concerned the termination of a participation contract between
Petroecuador, the Ecuadorian national oil company, Occidental
Exploration and Production Company, a foreign investor.83 The
dispute arose pursuant to an investment treaty that, like the TPP,
contained an investment arbitration consent. Petroecuador terminated
the agreement because Occidental had assigned its rights under the
agreement in violation of the contract's express terms.84 Occidental
argued that this termination violated the treaty's provision that
Ecuador shall extend fair and equitable treatment to foreign investors
like Occidental.8 5 The Occidental tribunal held that, while
Petroecuador had not wrongfully terminated the contract as a matter
of Ecuadorian law, the termination was not in keeping with best
oilfield practices.8 6 As such, it violated guarantees of fair and equitable
treatment codified in the investment reaty.87 Thus, transnationalists
argued, the arbitration remedy permitted an internationalization of
the contract that in turn protected the investor from unreasonable
political action by a host-state government.88
2. The Public Law Perspective
The international public law perspective is a competing approach
to evaluating investment arbitration. Responsive to an academic
backlash against the transnational conception of investment
arbitration, it focuses on the perspective of the local regulator.8 9 As one
author explained, "the main threat existing today is that [bilateral
investment treaties] might be interpreted as providing
standards . .. higher than those generally applied in developed
countries" as part of their own public law traditions.9 0 The answer
proposed by these critics of the transnational egal order is premised
in "public" or "administrative" law.9' This position is the most critical
82. See Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No.
ARB/06/11, Award (Oct. 5, 2012), IIC 561 (2012); Garcia, supra note 24, at 570-71.
83. Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, supra note 82, ¶T 115,
237-43.
84. See id. ¶j 3, 244.
85. Id. J¶ 237-43.
86. See id. ¶ 452.
87. Id.
88. See Garcia, supra note 24, at 570.
89. Michael Waibel et al., The Backlash Against Investment Arbitration:
Perceptions and Reality, in THE BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT ARBITRATION:
PERCEPTIONS AND REALITY xxxvi (2010) ("Commentators increasingly see signs of such
a backlash against the foreign investment regime.").
90. MONTT, supra note 25, at 75-76.
91. See, e.g., Gus VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC
LAW 45 (2007) (defining investment treaty arbitration as "a public law system"); Becky
L. Jacobs, A Perplexing Paradox: "De-Statification" of "Investor-State" Dispute
168 [VOL. 50:155
SUPERNA TIONAL LAW
of investment arbitration as a form of dispute resolution and the most
likely to submit that existing jurisprudence requires significant
correction to reflect the domestic policy interests of the host state.92
Although proponents of an international public law perspective
propose a number of different arguments, a few key common features
to their appraisal of investment law have emerged.93 First, they submit
that early jurisprudence and literature were too focused on the
commercial rights of investors.94 This focus translated into a quasi-
libertarian political economy imposed, by means of investor-state
arbitration, on host states, particularly in the developing world.95 This
libertarian political-economic preference is deeply inconsistent with
the political economic regime in place in developed countries, even the
United States.96 Their appraisal of international investment rights
thus noted that a serious inequity resulted from jurisprudence inspired
by the transnational legal order perspective: U.S. investors would
enjoy greater rights against a foreign government than they do against
their home government.9 7 The United States, in essence, exported legal
standards it was not willing to apply to itself.98
Second, adherents to the international public law perspective offer
a common cure for the problem: the key to addressing an appropriate
role for investment protection is to understand its function.99
Investment protection must respect the regulatory sovereignty of host
states first and foremost.1 00 Investment protection must make sure
Settlement?, 30 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 17, 48 (2015) (noting the need for greater public law
deference in investor-state arbitration); Jason Webb Yackee, Controlling the
International Investment Law Agency, 53 HARv. INT'L L.J. 391, 394 (2012) (same);
Stephan W. Schill, Enhancing International Investment Law's Legitimacy: Conceptual
and Methodological Foundations for a New Public Law Approach, 52 VA. J. INT'L L. 57,
98 (2011) [hereinafter Schill 2011] (outlining public law premise); MONTT, supra note 25,
at 12-17 (outlining the public law premise).
92. See MONTT, supra note 25, at 155, 159; VAN HARTEN, supra note 91, at 180-
84; Schill 2011, supra note 91, at 70 (promoting a better public law metric for dispute
resolution).
93. Compare Gus Van Harten et al., Public Statement on International
Investment Regime, OSGOOD HALL LAw SCH. (Aug. 31, 2010), https://www.osgoode.
yorku.ca/public-statement-international-investment-regime-31-august-2010/
[https://perma.cc/8RJT-HL82] (archived Oct. 1, 2016) [hereinafter Van Harten Public
Statement] (calling for dismantlement of investor-state arbitration), with MONTT, supra
note 25, at 155-59 (calling for the reform of investor-state arbitration from within).
94. See MONTT, supra note 25, at 75-76; VAN HARTEN, supra note 91, at 142;
Schill 2011, supra note 91, at 67.
95. See MONTT, supra note 25, at 77; VAN HARTEN, supra note 91, at 10, 139-43;
Schill 2011, supra note 91, at 67.
96. See MONTT, supra note 25, at 75-77; VAN HARTEN, supra note 91, at 144;
Schill 2011, supra note 91, at 68.
97. See MONTT, supra note 25, at 135-41; VAN HARTEN, supra note 91, at 145;
Schill 2011, supra note 91, at 78-85.
98. See VAN HARTEN, supra note 91, at 145.
99. See MONTT, supra note 25, at 129-33; VAN HARTEN, supra note 91, at 58-71;
Schill 2011, supra note 91, at 71-78.
100. See MONTT, supra note 25, at 135-41; VAN HARTEN, supra note 91, at 145;
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that host states develop appropriate safeguards for the protection of
investments in general (including foreign investment). In doing so, due
regard must be given to the non-commercial nature of regulation
governing investments and appropriate deference must be shown to
host-state policy decisions to protect constitutive values of public
welfare and democratic governance.10 ' Under no circumstances should
protections exceed the general principles of administrative law
developed in capital-importing states. Better still, a comparative law
exercise ought to identify global general principles of administrative
law-a lex mercatoriapublica-to govern investments, in keeping with
a general public law consensus.102
Third, adherents to the international public law perspective
submit that the use of arbitration to resolve international investment
disputes and the jurisprudence it has generated deprive the current
regime of a measure of legitimacy.1 03 They note that investment
arbitration has led to an informal system of precedent04 and early
decisions in such a system have a disproportionate ability to mold
future legal developments.0 5 As early decisions were informed by an
inapposite commercial paradigm, a different, more authoritative
mechanism is needed to alter the path-dependent course of existing
jurisprudence. 0 6 This mechanism could consist in a wholesale
replacement of the arbitration regime with a new judicial body.'07 It
also could be satisfied by introducing a tightly controlled appellate
review for arbitral awards to safeguard their legal correctness
(measure pursuant to public law principles),0 8 or by other less
invasive reforms. 109
In sum, the public law approach is most closely aligned with the
TPP and Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)
critics. It submits that investment arbitration is viable only if it can
Schill 2011, supra note 91, at 78-85.
101. See id.
102. See MONTT, supra note 25, at 288-91, 310-18; VAN HARTEN, supra note 91,
at 143-49; Schill 2011, supra note 91, at 85-90.
103. See MONTT, supra note 25, at 155; VAN HARTEN, supra note 91, at 152; Schill
2011, supra note 91, at 70.
104. See MONTT, supra note 25, at 109; VAN HARTEN, supra note 91, at 173-74
(noting the problem of bias in appointment decisions); Schill 2011, supra note 91, at 84.
105. See MONTT, supra note 25, at 90-103 (discussing path dependence and
network effects in the investment law context).
106. See MONTT, supra note 25, at 158-59 (discussing coherence in the wrong
direction).
107. See VAN HARTEN, supra note 91, at 180-84 (proposing the creation of an
international investment court with extensive jurisdiction over investor claim
adjudications).
108. See MONTT, supra note 25, at 155, 159 (promoting an appellate body plus
more detailed treaty drafting).




switch in time to a more deferential approach.1 10 If arbitration fails to
do so and undercuts the policy needs of host states, host states must
band together to resist arbitration and bring about the wholesale
replacement of the entire investment arbitration infrastructure.1
3. The Treaty Law Perspective
Recent literature has attempted to synthesize the insights of both
the transnational egal order and international public law perspective
through a treaty law perspective.112 The treaty law perspective insists
that investment relationships must be appreciated first and foremost
through the lens of the constitutive treaty documents.11 3 This means
that tribunals must interpret the underlying treaties giving rise to
investment claims by taking "seriously the interests of both home and
host states in order to reach fair and balanced terms as judged from
the collective perspective of both treaty parties."114 This approach
reveals the "platypus-like nature" of investment protection in
combining commercial interests with public law imperatives.15 But
the treaty perspective insists that the source of any investor
entitlements makes it unmistakably clear that investor claims remain
subordinate to the sovereign will that made them possible.11 6 The
treaty perspective thus submits that no external reform of the current
system is needed, as states have the ability to preempt interpretive
questions that could arise in the investor-state context by agreement
or, failing agreement, state-to-state dispute resolution.'17
110. See MONT, supra note 25, at 155-59.
111. See Van Harten Public Statement, supra note 93 (calling for dismantlement
of investor-state arbitration).
112. See generally Anthea Roberts, Power and Persuasion in Investment Treaty
Interpretation: The Dual Role of States, 104 AM. J. INT'L L. 179 passim (2010) [hereinafter
Roberts 2010]; see also Anthea Roberts, Clash of Paradigms: Acts and Analogies Shaping
the Investment Treaty System, 107 AM. J. INT'L L. 45, 93 (2013) [hereinafter Roberts
2013]; Roberts 2015, supra note 26 passim.
113. See Roberts 2015, supra note 26, at 356-57 (stating a need for an interpretive
theory that conceptualizes investment treaties in terms of the relationship they create
between investors, home states, and host states).
114. Id. at 359.
115. See Roberts 2013, supra note 112, at 93 (discussing the platypus-type nature
of investor-state arbitration by reference to the mammal and non-mammal, birdlike
features of the platypus); Anthea Roberts, State-to-State Investment Treaty Arbitration:
A Hybrid Theory of Interdependent Rights and Shared Interpretive Authority, 55 HARV.
INT'L L. J. 1, 28 (2014) [hereinafter Roberts 2014].
116. See Roberts 2015, supra note 26, at 406 ("Investors have investment treaty
rights if and to the extent granted by states; these rights are not inherent in the notion
of being an investor like certain human rights are inherent in the notion of being a
human.").
117. See id. at 413 ("Investor-state tribunals do not have jurisdiction to review
directly the legality of joint terminations and amendments or to impose compensation
obligations on the treaty parties for such action.").
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The bedrock of the attempted treaty law synthesis is that both the
pure transnational legal order and international public law
perspectives make a fatal formal mistake:11 8 they seek to divorce
investment protection from the law governing the principal source of
investor rights-investment reaties.1 19 The law of treaties anchors the
relationship between a state and an investor in international law. 120
In fact, the investor is simply a third-party beneficiary of the treaty
rights of its home state, as codified in the state-to-state context by
Articles 34-37 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Law
of Treaties).121
The treaty law perspective resolves the problem of how to
interpret frequently open-ended and vague treaty standards.12 2 The
Law of Treaties facially mandates that treaties be interpreted like
contracts-within their four corners, giving the terms of the treaty
their ordinary meaning.123 This method of interpretation can create
problems when treaty parties use intentionally open-ended and vague
treaty language.124 As many treaties use open-ended language, this
does not prove fatal to treaty interpretation;1 25 rather, in those
instances, the treaty must be interpreted in light of its stated object
and purpose,126 joint interpretation or amendment,'27 and relevant
subsequent practice.'28
The goal (or object and purpose) of investment treaties is to
internationalize the review otherwise available to investors against
state action.129 This object and purpose places the treaty squarely
within the context of administrative law (i.e., the area of law that
would govern the investor's cause of action in the absence of a
treaty).130 In interpreting the specific language of the treaty, the object
118. See id.
119. See id. at 412.
120. See id. at 405.
121. See id. at 369-70; Roberts 2010, supra note 112, at 211.
122. See Roberts 2015, supra note 26, at 357, 375-88 (interpreting investment
treaties in light of their goals); Roberts 2010, supra note 112, at 209 n.143 (interpreting
investment treaties according to object and purpose).
123. See Roberts 2010, supra note 112, at 201.
124. See id. at 210 (explaining that "many investment treaty provisions contain
vague standards" with a variety of reasonable interpretations).
125. See id. at 201.
126. See id. at 209 n. 143 (interpreting investment treaties in light of their goals);
Roberts 2015, supra note 26, at 357, 375-88 (emphasizing party intention in investment
treaties' interpretation); Roberts 2014, supra note 115, at 20-24 (discussing the purpose
of investment treaties).
127. See Roberts 2015, supra note 26, at 403-08 (discussing joint termination);
Roberts 2010, supra note 112, at 210 (discussing joint interpretation).
128. Roberts 2010, supra note 112, at 201.
129. See Roberts 2015, supra note 26, at 374-75, 381-82 (discussing the public
law qualification).
130. See id. at 374 ("The literature has already clearly recognized the need to
analyze the investor-host state relationship through a public law paradigm.").
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and purpose thus preclude anything but deferential review of state
action. 131
The treaty law perspective submits that this functional
interpretation remains subject to correction by the treaty states under
any classic interpretive mechanisms provided for by the Law of
Treaties.132 Interpretation methodologies that place too great an
emphasis on the object and purpose of a treaty give tribunals
significant discretion-tribunals are free to choose almost any object
and purpose to guide their interpretation. This means that there must
be a control against tribunal overreach. The Law of Treaties resolves
this question in favor of state-to-state agreement and dispute
resolution.13 3 Thus, when an important question arises in a cluster of
cases, the treaty law paradigm gives primacy to the treaty parties to
interpret and adapt their bargain to the current circumstance.13 4 If
such interpretation and adaptation cannot be achieved through
negotiation, either treaty party has the right to state-to-state dispute
resolution to determine how the issue should be resolved.1 35 This safety
valve thus keeps states in absolute control of the investment rights
bestowed upon investors by means of international treaties.136 In so
doing, it provides an ironclad tiebreaker for any interpretive problem
an investor-state tribunal might encounter.1 3 7
The key virtue of the treaty law perspective is that it provides a
ready means for reform in the face of perceived arbitral excesses.
138
International public law proponents argue that existing jurisprudence
deviates, at times significantly, from state expectations.1 39 They
therefore advocate for systemic reform.140 Such reform is difficult if not
impossible to achieve in practice.141 By focusing on state-to-state
dispute resolution as a safety valve, the treaty law perspective achieves
the aim of legal reform within existing treaty design and thus is a more
realistic tool for attempts at legal reform.142
131. See id. at 380-81.
132. See id. at 403-09 (discussing joint termination); Roberts 2014, supra note
115, at 63 (discussing state-to-state dispute resolution as "preliminary reference
procedure").
133. See Roberts 2014, supra note 115, at 63.
134. See id. at 55; Roberts 2015, supra note 26, at 384-86.
135. Roberts 2014, supra note 115, at 63.
136. See Roberts 2015, supra note 26, at 406.
137. Id.
138. See Roberts 2015, supra note 26, at 403--09; Roberts 2014, supra note 115, at
63.
139. See supra subsection I.B.1.
140. See supra subsection I.B. 1.
141. Andrea Menaker et al., Is ICSID Losing Its Appeal ... Again?, 105 AM. Soc'Y
INT'L L. PROC. 193, 211 (2011) ("[I]t is practically impossible to amend the ICSID
Convention.").
142. Roberts 2015, supra note 26, at 403-09; Roberts 2014, supra note 115, at 63.
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B. Blind Spots of the Dominant Approaches
The three approaches laid out in Section A have two blind spots in
common that make them poor diagnostic or remedial tools. First, all
three approaches are fundamentally asymmetrical-they theorize only
host-state liability rather than proposing a framework for mutual
rights and obligations between the state and the investor. This first
flaw flows from the comparative dominance in the academic discourse
of literature on investment treaty arbitration rather than a balanced
approach that would keep in mind the contractual relationship
underlying treaty claims as well.
Second, all three approaches can be deconstructed as relying on
inapposite legal frameworks. Each approach seeks to assimilate the
interests of investor or host state into the framework of the other. In
doing so, the approaches ignore the fact that the predicate for such
assimilation is not present: investors are not states, states are not
commercial actors, and arbitral tribunals are not administrative
agencies and do not respond to international administrative agencies.
1. The Core Asymmetry of Current Approaches
All three dominant approaches focus on state action.143
Arbitration is a means to impose liability on a state for its wrongful
conduct.144 Wrongfulness is determined principally by reference to
treaty norms, most prominently, fair and equitable treatment.145 The
dominant approaches merely disagree with one another on whether the
predicate for liability is reasonableness from a commercial,
administrative, or public international perspective.146
If this assessment is correct, investor-state arbitration is
asymmetrical. It does not allow for claims by the state against the
investor.14 7 State recourse would only lie municipally, against the
investment.148 It would not lie internationally against the foreign
investor.14 9 This is a potentially significant limitation, as damages
caused by an investor might well exceed the residual value of the
investment.




147. See RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 26 (2012) (noting that counterclaims would require
treaty amendments); DUGAN ET AL., supra note 21, at 153-54 (treating counterclaims
skeptically).
148. MONTT, supra note 25, at 243-53.
149. See id. (explaining when municipal law is relevant and when investments
and investors are protected).
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Such asymmetry would support the view, advanced by TPP and
TTIP critics, that arbitration overly favors multinational
corporations.150 The issue, then, would not be that investors recovered
in a disproportionate number of cases-an assertion that has been
quantitatively disproved'51-rather, the issue would be that only
investors can recover, potentially leading to excess state liability by
denying states the ability to pursue and receive set-offs for their claims
or otherwise hold investors liable should set-offs exceed state liability.
Such asymmetry means that the investor-state dispute settlement
system is "rigged" because the investor would have nothing to fear by
prosecuting claims, even in the face of egregious investor
wrongdoing.152
This asymmetrical view of investment treaty arbitration is
inaccurate. For one, "governments continuously raise 'counter-claims'
to reject or at least diminish the compensation obligation."15 3 They, in
fact, have done so from the very first investor-state arbitration at the
World Bank's ICSID, the principal investor-state arbitral
institution.154 If raising such claims were futile, as the predominant
position on investor-state arbitration intimates, states would cease to
raise them.155 Rather, it is fair to assume that such claims will be taken
into account, at the very latest, at the quantum stage, as was done, for
example, by the Occidental v. Ecuador tribunal.15 6
Beyond the investment reaty arbitration studied by the dominant
approaches, it becomes even more apparent that any such asymmetry
is perceived rather than real.'5 7 State entities face comparatively few
hurdles in bringing contract claims against investors in the
international commercial setting.15 8 Prevalent arbitral jurisprudence
further permits commercial counterparties to use international
150. See Roberts 2015, supra note 26, at 403-09; Roberts 2014, supra note 115, at
63.
151. See Franck & Wylie, supra note 11, at 517-18.
152. See Kahale, supra note 15, at 191-200.
153. Thomas W. Walde & Borzu Sabahi, Compensation, Damages and Valuation,
in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 73, at 1049,
1097.
154. See Pierre Lalive, The First 'World Bank' Arbitration (Holiday Inns v.
Morocco)-Some Legal Problems, 51 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 123, 131 (1980) ("At a later date,
a counter-claim, perhaps inevitably, was lodged by the Moroccan Government.").
155. See Roberts 2015, supra note 26, at 403-09; Roberts 2014, supra note 115, at
63-68.
156. See Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, supra note 82, ¶1
825, 866.
157. See Roberts 2015, supra note 26, at 365 ("I leave to one side considerations
of whether and, if so, how investment treaty rights might be supplemented (or, more
controversially, qualified) by contractual rights under an investor-host state
agreement.").
158. See THE UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES: A COMMENTARY 426-29 (David
Caron & Lee Caplan eds., 2013) (noting the ease with which counterclaims can be
commenced).
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arbitral proceedings to resolve tort or statutory disputes that have a
sufficient connection to the document containing the arbitration
consent.159 Depending on the structure chosen by the parties,
arbitration could cover far more than is currently addressed in the
literature.
Current approaches, in other words, fall meaningfully short of
providing a complete picture of the rights and obligations that could,
at any point in time, be subject to arbitration. In choosing their vantage
point, these approaches thus leave behind significant value that
arbitration might hold for the host state.
2. Deconstructing the Dominant Approaches
All three dominant approaches are not only asymmetrical, but
also defend a view of investment arbitration that is untenable. As
discussed below, the transnational perspective makes inapposite
assumptions about state action, the administrative law perspective
makes inapposite assumptions about tribunal (and host-state)
competences, and the treaty law perspective makes inapposite
assumptions about investor status. Each of these failings showcases
that, while the dominant approaches provide a valuable perspective on
investment arbitration, they are too positionally limited to provide a
basis to formulate a coherent response to current arbitration critics.
a. Transnational Law
Investment arbitration cannot tenably be conceptualized from a
transnational law perspective. Transnational law submits that
investment arbitration is and must be appropriately responsive to
commercial needs in imposing liability on states (to limit political
risk).160 It argues that such arbitral decisions are not rigged or biased
because they measure state conduct against a truly neutral,
autonomous, global, and commercial yardstick that does not pass
judgment on the policy decision, as such-just its commercial
reasonableness.161 This view of investment arbitration is ultimately
self-defeating. It draws on transnational commercial best practices to
assess conduct that is by definition non-commercial, that is, state
regulation.162
159. See BLAcKABY ET AL., supra note 69, at 79.
160. See supra subsection I.A. 1.
161. See Markus A. Petsche, International Commercial Arbitration and the
Transformation of the Conflict of Laws Theory, 18 MICH. ST. J. INT'L L. 453, 487 (2010).
162. See DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 147, at 216-27 (discussing the
importance of the distinction in the attribution context). Rather than dealing with the
issue in the attribution context, the architecture of investment treaties and contracts
would suggest hat the problem could better be dealt with on the merits. Cf. Tulip Real
Estate Inv. & Dev. Neth. B.V. v. Turk., ICSID Case No. ARB/11/28, Separate Opinion
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If investment arbitration operated according to truly
transnational legal principles, arbitrators would seek to discern
whether global commercial actors would have acted like the host
state.16 3 Commercial actors are not in the business of social welfare.164
States, however, frequently are.165 Consequently, any social welfare
program impairing an investment would be commercially
unreasonable (i.e., it would redistribute social goods according to
fairness concerns).166 In other words, arbitral tribunals would act as
libertarian caricatures because they would impose liability for every
social welfare program that negatively affected investor
profitability.167 Even the most aggressive investors do not make so
radical a claim.168
Alternatively, a transnational aw perspective could meet its goal
of a value-neutral appraisal of policy by establishing whether there
was a rational basis for state action.169 Avoiding the need to test the
substantive validity of host-state policy, this analysis would be reduced
to ascertaining whether the state acted with animus or bad faith. 170
This view would run directly counter to investment arbitration
jurisprudence. In any event, it would do little to limit investors'
political risk exposure.
To avoid both extremes, decisions heralded by transnational legal
scholarship typically apply some form of proportionality analysis.17 '
This jurisprudence borrows its proportionality analysis from
administrative or human rights law. 172 This proportionality analysis,
in point of fact, does test the substance of state policy choices.
(Mar. 10, 2014), IIC 641 (2014) (rejecting the majority's attribution analysis on similar
grounds). The author served as consulting expert for the claimant in annulment
proceedings.
163. See BERGER, supra note 38, at 97.
164. See AMARTYA SEN, COMMODITIES AND CAPABILITIES 1-2, 12-16 (1999)
(discussing the problem of utility in welfare economics).
165. See id.
166. See AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE 269-90 (2009) (discussing the
importance of fairness as a modifier for utility in policy choices).
167. See MONTT, supra note 25, at 75-77 (discussing BIT jurisprudence).
168. Even in the most extreme of cases, claimants do not contend that a state does
not have the right to regulate. See Philip Morris Brands Sirl v. Oriental Republic of
Uru., ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, Decision on Jurisdiction, T 166 (July 2, 2013), IIC 597
(2013) ("The Claimants do not contest Uruguay's right to adopt non-discriminatory,
legitimate regulation to protect public health.").
169. See Locke v. Warner Bros., Inc., 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 921 (Ct. App. 1997)
(interpreting the implied contractual duty of good faith and fair dealing). Review in such
cases may lie most promisingly in the context of proven animus. See generally Susannah
Pollvogt, Unconstitutional Animus, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 887 passim (2012) (discussing
a similar problem from a U.S. constitutional law perspective).
170. See MONTT, supra note 25, at 137-41.
171. Tecmed S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2,
Award, ¶ 122 (May 29, 2003), IIC 247 (2003); Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Republic of
Ecuador, supra note 82, T 404.
172. See Tecmed S.A. v. United Mexican States, supra note 171, ¶ 122.
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Importing such an analysis is ultimately inconsistent with the view
advanced by transnational law proponents that transnational
tribunals are apolitical. Transnational aw thus must rely on precisely
the kind of decision making it sought to avoid in order to produce
acceptable results.173 This, however, means that it is results-oriented,
and, as such, openly political rather than rule-based, and thus
exclusively legal in tenor.
b. Public Law
Global administrative law also fails to adequately conceptualize
investment arbitration. This scholarship seeks to integrate arbitral
decision making into a broader administrative law framework.174 It
argues that arbitrators should apply the public law deference shown
by municipal courts to administrative agency decisions.175 It submits
that this approach functionally takes account of the regulatory
interests at stake in investment arbitration.7 6
This perspective is not tenable because it divorces municipal
standards of review from their immediate context-municipal
administrative agency decisions.'77 Municipal public law seeks to
embed the growth and legitimacy of administrative agencies in
(written) constitutions.1 78 Agencies are created in order to develop
subject matter expertise in effectuating social policy choices.1 79 For
example, an administrative institution such as the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) has unique expertise in how to ascertain the
safety and efficacy of new pharmaceuticals brought to market in the
United States, in accordance with its congressional mandate to do
173. See supra subsection I.A.1.
174. MONTT, supra note 25, at 137-41.
175. Id. at 337; see VAN HARTEN, supra note 91, at 150; Schill 2011, supra note
91, at 71.
176. See MONTT, supra note 25, at 137-41.
177. See LASSWELL & MCDOUGAL, supra note 28, at 155; see also Benedict
Kingsbury, Niko Krisch & Richard B. Stewart, The Emergence of Global Administrative
Law, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15, 17 (2005) (linking global administrative law to
emerging but scattered global administrative bodies notably lacking an investment
agency); Benedict Kingsbury, The Concept of 'Law' in Global Administrative Law, 20
EUR. J. INT'L L. 23, 27 (2009) ("Global administrative law cannot be understood as a
simple transposition to the global administrative space of the functions performed, let
alone of the specific rules and institutional interactions, that have been painstakingly
made and remade in the crucibles where national administrative law is produced and
refined.").
178. See David S. Rubenstein, Administrative Federalism as Separation of
Powers, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 171, 175 (2015) (noting that in the U.S. context, there
has arisen a "enormously powerful, yet constitutionally insecure, administrative
machine"); Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation ofPowers, 113 HARV. L. REV. 633, 691-
92 (2000) (discussing the constitutional egitimacy of administrative law).
179. See Ackerman, supra note 178, at 696 ("[P]arliaments have neither the time




so. 180 An FDA decision is not easily second-guessed by a U.S. court as
a matter of institutional expertise.1 81 Further, it is, at least arguably,
not easily second-guessed for separation-of-powers reasons.182
There are no analogous international administrative agencies to
which international investment tribunals would respond. 183 There are
also no constitutive processes in the international context that would
resemble the U.S. separation of powers.184 These institutional
differences make it imprudent to require investment tribunals to apply
the kind of deference shown by municipal courts to administrative
agencies.1 85 The administrative law perspective seeks to address the
lack of international administrative agencies by treating the arbitral
tribunal as the relevant administrative actor.18 6 This argument does
not provide support for a view that investment tribunals should apply
a deferential review to state action. The tribunal would become the
administrative agency rather than the reviewing court and thus would
have full rule-making power.1 87 This would expand rather than limit
the powers of investment tribunals.8 8 It would, in any event, be
inconsistent with the underlying consents to arbitration, as these
consents empower tribunals to decide disputes rather than make
policy.189
To avoid this extreme, public law advocates draw upon the effects
of regulation of property rights.1 90 They suggest that investment
tribunals sitting as quasi-administrative agencies should impose
liability by reference to whether the state regulation in question affects
core or only peripheral property rights.19' This move threatens to
collapse back into the transnational legal position of examining the
value of the right taken from a commercial vantage point-a right is
considered to be at the core if it deprives similarly situated actors of
180. See James T. O'Reilly, Losing Deference in the FDA's Second Century:
Judicial Review, Politics, and a Diminished Legacy of Expertise, 93 CORNELL L. REV.
939, 965 (2008).
181. See id. at 941-42.
182. See Ackerman, supra note 178, at 691-92 (discussing the constitutional
legitimacy of administrative law); Rubenstein, supra note 178, at 175 (noting that in the
U.S. context, there has arisen a "enormously powerful, yet constitutionally insecure,
administrative machine").
183. See Kingsbury, Krisch & Stewart, supra note 177, at 17.
184. Cf. Tecmed S.A. v. United Mexican States, supra note 171, T 122.
185. See id.
186. MONTT, supra note 25, at 137-41.
187. See Ray Diamond & Frederic Sourgens, Administrative Law, in 3
ANGLOAMERIKANISCHE RECHTSSPRACHE (Franz Heidinger ed., 2016).
188. See id.
189. See LARS MARKERT, STREITSCHLICHTUNGSKLAUSELN IN
INVESTITIONSSCHUTZABKOMMEN 156 (2009) (discussing the scope of all prevalent forms
of treaty arbitration consents).
190. See MONTT, supra note 25, at 186, 252, 264 (defining administrative law
protections by reference to the core-peripheral property rights distinction).
191. Id.
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nearly all of the value for which they acquired it.192 By defining the
impairment of property rights commercially, the measure of liability-
when investment tribunals sitting in a supposedly quasi-
administrative capacity should impose liability-is no longer
responsive to sovereign needs.19 3 It no longer justifies the
subordination of property rights to reasonable sovereign regulation. 194
Such a justification becomes a matter of naked policy preference that
is without ultimate defense in public law theory. The lack of global
administrative agencies to set informed policy thus is not ephemeral:
it threatens to undermine the viability of a global public law approach
to investor-state relationships.
c. Treaty Law
Finally, the treaty law perspective also is not a tenable theory of
investor-state arbitration. The treaty law perspective seeks to achieve
goals similar to the public law perspective but looks to a different form
of delegation to achieve this end: delegated authority from the host and
home state (as opposed to delegated authority in the constitutional law
setting).195 This delegated authority is intended to provide legal
security for the application of broadly worded treaty norms in specific
instances. 196 But, as delegated authority, arbitral jurisdiction remains
beholden to the intention of the states that created it, and, as such, is
ultimately subject to state modification or termination. 197 Presumably,
to avoid such corrective measures, tribunals should be conservative in
their approach to imposing state liability.198
The treaty law perspective falls prey to the most common form of
international law deconstructive critique.19 9 It both wishes to impose
positive norms constraining state behavior ("increase confidence and
enforcement of . .. rights"2 00) and to state that all norms arise
exclusively from state consent ("the tribunal should defer to [state]
decision in order to respect party autonomy"20 1). Treaty parties enter
into investment treaties in order to promote investment and
depoliticize investment disputes.202 To arrive at these norms, treaties
192. Id.
193. Id. at 165.
194. Id.
195. See Roberts 2010, supra note 112, at 183-84 ("To increase confidence in and
enforcement of those rights, states have delegated the power to resolve investor-state
disputes to arbitral tribunals.").
196. See id.
197. See id. at 185-91.
198. See Roberts 2015, supra note 26, at 369.
199. See MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA 67 (2005) (laying out
the deconstructive critique).
200. Roberts 2010, supra note 112, at 183.
201. Roberts 2015, supra note 26, at 369.
202. See id. at 373.
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are classic pre-commitment devices.203 They can achieve these ends
because the obligations contained in investment treaties are
reasonably stable and are given independent normative force.204
Failing such normative force, treaties would be uniquely ineffective in
achieving any goals; they do not give rise to ex ante reliance interests
on the part of investors.
At the same time, the treaty law perspective invokes state consent
as sovereign and able to displace ex post any reasonable bargain struck
in investment treaties.20 5 It thus undoes the function of investment
treaties as legal pre-commitment devices.206 It expressly submits that
investment treaties provide protections de facto rather than de lege.207
States, in other words, use investment treaties as pre-commitment
devices unless they change their mind at some point in the future when
the pre-commitment devices could be invoked. This proposition is
nakedly nonsensical.
The treaty law perspective cannot ultimately claim to be a
"hybrid" system of any kind.20 8 Rather than organize the reliance
interests of states and investors coherently, it eviscerates the interests
of investors.209 This result is not warranted by the theory it develops.
It too thus proposes an arbitrary, result-oriented rubric rather than a
theoretically sound systematization of investment disputes.
III. THE SUPERNATIONAL LAw HYPOTHESIS
"[T]ext-books, law journal articles, and casebooks are
characteristically organized and written in terms of technical legal
concepts and rules, not in terms of factual problems."21 0 This critical
observation is directly applicable to the core problem plaguing current
academic theories seeking to make sense of legal transactions between
states (or state-controlled actors) on the one hand and multinational
corporations on the other: they sacrifice the factual complexity of such
transactions for doctrinal coherence.211 They then cannot achieve such
coherence because the policy preference that each theory seeks to
impose unravels as a matter of its own methodological
commitments.212
203. See Craig Martin, A Model for Constitutional Constraints on the Use of Force
in Compliance with International Law, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 611, 672-92 (2011) (laying out
the constitutive function of pre-commitment devices).
204. See Roberts 2015, supra note 26, at 375.
205. See id. at 413.
206. Cf. Martin, supra note 203, at 673-79.
207. See Roberts 2015, supra note 26, at 414-16.
208. Contra Roberts 2013, supra note 112 passim (explaining the hybridity of
investment treaties).
209. Cf. Roberts 2015, supra note 26, at 414-16.
210. LASSWELL & MCDOUGAL, supra note 28, at 272.
211. See infra Section I.B.
212. See id.
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This Article addresses this shortcoming by looking at the entirety
of the factual problem posed by investment transactions and disputes.
Most immediately, this approach must overcome the asymmetry
plaguing the current approaches to investment arbitration discussed
above. In other words, any approach to investment transactions and
disputes must be able to make sense of the observation, made by one
investment treaty tribunal, that investment agreements "oblige
governments to conduct their relations with foreign investors in a
transparent fashion. Some reciprocal if not identical obligations lie on
the foreign investor."2 1 3
From a factual perspective, it is evident that a legal regime
creating rights in multinationals must operate with some
reciprocity.2 14 Politics and money, sovereign leviathans and corporate
behemoths, are in constant intercourse.215 To be sustainable,
investment relationships cannot be totally one-sided but rather must
assign risks and rewards to all participants, sovereign and corporate
alike.216
In order to respond to the factual problem posed by investment
transactions and disputes, this Part takes a process approach. The
approach is, in the first instance, empirical. It seeks to gather and
understand "information relevant to making social choices."217 It
begins not with legal characterization of social choice but with the
choice itself.218 This empirical approach makes readily apparent that
"[a]greement is often based on disagreement."219 In a small setting,
agreement to buy and sell a certain stock for $5 can occur when the
buyer and the seller have different views on stock value because they
have different interests.220 This difference in value or interests
between buyer and seller results in a transaction when the interests
213. Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Services Worldwide v. Republic of the Phil.,
ICSID Case No. ARB/03/25, Award, 1 402 (Aug. 16, 2007), IIC 299 (2007). The author
served as counsel to Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Services Worldwide in the arbitration
proceedings.
214. The literature is replete with discussions of systemic benefits to be received
by the host state as a result of entering into investment treaties and contracts. What
current literature ignores is that such benefits per force must exist on a transaction-by-
transaction basis to rise to the level of systemic importance; it assumes conceptual
abstractions without due regard for the brick and mortar benefits which must exist to
give reality to its academic musings. See, e.g., MONTT, supra note 25, at 57-75
(discussing host-state benefits from BITs); Roberts 2015, supra note 26, at 357, 375-88
(same); Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 16 passim (same); see also Jason Webb Yackee,
Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Promote Foreign Direct Investment? Some Hints from
Alternative Evidence, 51 VA. J. INT'L L. 397 passim (2011) (same).
215. See SUSAN STRANGE, THE RETREAT OF THE STATE: THE DIFFUSION OF POWER
IN THE WORLD ECONOMY 91-96 (1996) (discussing the diffusion of authority in world
society).
216. See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
217. REISMAN, supra note 43, at 175.
218. Id.




dovetail (I want to sell at $5, you want to buy at $5).221 Social choice
writ large is no different-it becomes plural, and inconsistent value
demands by process participants support a single decision, albeit for
different reasons.222
Thus, to make sense of the rules governing social choice, a process
approach must unpack the diverging interests supporting a decision,
or, in more abstract terms, integrate the pluralist demands and
identifications of process participants.223 In the current context, the
decision is the arbitral award resulting from a clash of the pluralist
demands and identifications of investors and host-state agents.2 2 4 Less
visibly, decision making transcends the realm of disputes and is part
and parcel of transactions, the largest proportion of which will be
effectuated without need for formal dispute resolution processes.225
Theorizing and explaining such decision-making requires a strong
contextual perspective.226 Rather than seeking clarity through textual
abstraction, integrative decision making is immanent in and
inseparable from the specific facts giving rise to it. 227 Decisions
integrate new problems and solutions in the frame of reference of
states, commercial actors, and administrative agencies,
respectively.228 They thus internalize the obligations each owes to
others by reference to their own respective normative horizons.229 it
renders new phenomena intelligible to each actor by placing them in
the context of the linguistic web of each process participant.230 Further,
it translates the linguistic web of other process participants through
reciprocal appreciation and engagement of the same factual
predicate.2 3 '
221. Id.
222. Id. at 76 (including welfare motives in dovetailing interests).
223. See LASSWELL & MCDouGAL, supra note 28, at 280; Harold Hongju Koh,
Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 203-05 (1996) (founding transnational
legal process theory and discussing the importance of internalization as a part of that
process).
224. See REISMAN, supra note 43, at 180 (discussing the role of investment
tribunals as decision-makers).
225. See DIANE A. DESIERTO, PUBLIC POLICY IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW:
THE ICESCR IN TRADE, FINANCE AND INVESTMENT 373-76 (2015) (applying this mode of
decision making to investment design); REISMAN, supra note 43, at 183-90 (discussing
context-policy decision-making in international law in general).
226. See REISMAN, supra note 43, at 180, 183-90 (discussing the role of context in
decision making).
227. See Fr6d6ric G. Sourgens, Reconstructing International Law as Common
Law, 47 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 1, 35-37 (2014) (discussing the inductive, creative
nature of public international law decision making).
228. See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
229. Id.
230. See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophische Untersuchungen, in WITTGENSTEIN
WERKAUSGABE VOL. I 238-41 (Suhrkamp Verlag ed., 1984) (discussing the concept of
language games); SOURGENS, supra note 27, at 27-28 (using language game theory in
the context of investor-state arbitration).
231. See Sourgens, supra note 227, at 44-50 (discussing the translative function
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The hypothesis this Part proposes is that it is possible to
reconstitute a supernational law by reference to reciprocal reliance
analysis. Reliance at its core describes the interests arising out of
detrimental changes in position undertaken by one party premised on
the trust of future stability and potential reward.2 32 All types of law,
in one form or another, protect reliance interests: international law
recognizes such reliance interests through unilateral acts;233
transnational commercial law gives effect to reliance by means of
principles of good faith;234 and administrative law appreciates reliance
interests by looking to proportionality.235 This Article will theorize how
these various conceptions of reliance permit the integration,
translation, and balance of dovetailing interests in the investment
context.236 It will demonstrate that the arbitration provisions currently
under attack by TPP and TTIP critics play a constitutive role in
protecting and integrating each of these divergent reliance interests by
remaining operationally open to the divergent functions of each
reliance interest and cognitively open to the prescriptive context giving
rise to them.237
IV. THE UNILATERAL ACT ELEMENT OF SUPERNATIONAL LAW
States look to the world economy to attract capital and
expertise.238 In order to attract capital and expertise, a state must be
able to bind itself to non-state actors.2 39 Pragmatically, this means that
the non-state actor must be able to reliably enforce any obligations
entered into by the state and thus requires some form of international
dispute resolution, typically arbitration.240 As it is unlikely that the
host state would assist in the enforcement of an award against it,
awards must be globally enforceable.24 1
of good faith in international law).
232. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS §1.6 (2004).
233. See infra Part IV.
234. See infra Part V.
235. See infra Part VI.
236. See id.
237. See Julie A. Maupin, Public and Private International Investment Law: An
Integrated Systems Approach, 54 VA. J. INT'L L. 367, 372, 418 (2014) (submitting that a
systems approach (as opposed to a process approach) must at a minimum treat
arbitration as operationally closed and cognitively open).
238. See SALACUSE, supra note 5, at 345 (noting the intention to attract capital
and technology as a key state motivator).
239. See id.
240. See id. at 331 (noting the importance of enforceability of commitments).
241. See Jean-Paul Dechamps, Argentina: Appeal Court Rules on Enforcement of
ICSID Awards, GLOBAL ARB. REv. (Aug. 26, 2015), http://globalarbitrationreview.com/a
rticle/1034718/argentina-appeal-court-rules-on-enforcement-of-icsid-awards [https://
perma.cclL49U-3ZV8] (archived Oct. 17, 2016) (discussing opposition to enforcement of
ICSID awards in Argentina).
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Both states and non-state actors would want state obligations to
be reasonably context-sensitive. A regime that would require a
transitional society, such as Ukraine, to develop the regulatory
stability of the United States overnight would be facially absurd.242
Similarly, a regime that would excuse actions by transitional
societies-Kazakhstan is another example-simply because they are
transitional would render obligations under it meaningless.243 The
regime thus has to look to context and determine the appropriate level
of protections extended to non-state actors, that is, it must be tailored
to protect reasonable reliance interests.244
The international doctrinal basis for protecting such reliance
interests is the law of unilateral acts.245 A unilateral act is an
obligation incurred by a state to a specific addressee without a need for
international legal privity. 246 Classic international law recognizes that
unilateral acts can serve as a basis for state obligations to non-state
actors.247 Unilateral acts, therefore, are particularly helpful to protect
the reliance interests of actors lacking treaty capacity.248 When
combined with international arbitration, these acts permit the kind of
enforceable dispute resolution that is most meaningful to investors.
Although it may at first appear artificial to treat state obligations
to non-state actors as unilateral acts, perhaps particularly when a
state entity has entered into a contract with an investor, the artifice is
one of legal form rather than pragmatic substance. As discussed below,
as a matter of substance, the law of unilateral acts is superior in
addressing the needs of investor-state dispute resolution because it is
context-sensitive. The predominant treaty paradigm is decidedly
242. See Generation Ukraine, Inc. v. Ukr., ICSID Case No. ARB/00/9, Award, 1
20, 37 (Sept. 16, 2003), IIC 116 (2003) (noting the importance of Ukraine's economic
development for purposes of setting legitimate expectations); Peter Muchlinski, 'Caveat
Investor? The Relevance of the Conduct of the Investor under the Fair and Equitable
Treatment Standard, 55 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 527, 545 (2006) (discussing Generation
Ukraine). For recent case law adopting a similar approach, see Oxus Gold PLC v.
Republic of Uzb., Award, ¶ 793 (Dec. 17, 2015), (giving due regard to Uzbekistan's state
of development, political and legal framework).
243. See Rumeli Telekom A.S. v. Republic of Kaz., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/16,
Award, T 618 (July 29, 2008), IIC 344 (2008), (holding that Kazakhstan violated
applicable treaty standards because a working group decision "lacked transparency and
due process and was unfair, in contradiction with the requirements of the fair and
equitable treatment principle").
244. See Todd J. Grierson Weiler & Ian A. Laird, Standards of Treatment, in
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 73, at 259, 282
(linking investment treaty protection to reasonable reliance interests).
245. See Nuclear Tests (Austl. V. Fr.), Judgment, 1974 I.C.J. Rep. 253, 267 (Dec.
20) [hereinafter Nuclear Tests].
246. See Fr6d6ric G. Sourgens, Keep the Faith: Investment Protection Following
the Denunciation of International Investment Agreements, 11 SANTA CLARA J. INT'L L.
335, 396 (2013) (discussing unilateral acts in international investment law).
247. See Reisman & Arsanjani, supra note 33 passim.
248. See also supra note 45 and accompanying text.
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context-hostile.24 9 It is this hostility to relevant context that, perhaps
ironically, reveals the predominant treaty paradigm as the truly
artificial construct of legal habituation.
A. The Constitutive Function of Dispute Resolution
The existence of a right requires a remedy for its breach.250 This
means that the reliance an investor places in state promises or
representations is only as reasonable as the dispute resolution
mechanism available to enforce them.2 5 1 The consent to arbitration
included in treaties like the TPP and TTIP thus has a constitutive
function: it makes available a decision process to determine the
respective consequences of promises and representations.252 The
availability of this decision process is itself super-national in the sense
of being "above" national remedies because it (1) provides a process
above and beyond those of national law, (2) is global in nature, and (3)
is anchored in a state's international legal obligations.
Arbitral jurisprudence confirms this functional insight. Questions
of arbitral consent, that is, jurisdiction, are deemed different in a way
that is more important than any other aspect of the legal regimes set
up to protect foreign investment.253 The importance of jurisdiction is
that it is the condition sine qua non for any investor remedy and thus
any substantive international investor rights.254
The law of unilateral acts explains the constitutive function of
dispute resolution provisions for the creation of international reliance
interests. Unilateral acts give rise to reasonable reliance interests
when a state communicates its intent to incur a legal obligation. 255 Not
every governmental statement can reasonably be relied on so as to give
rise to a legal obligation for the state making it under international
249. See Myres McDougal, The International Law Commission's Draft Articles
Upon Interpretation: Textuality Redivious, 61 AM. J. INT'L L. 990, 992 (1967) (criticizing
the current treaty interpretation paradigm as overly textual and insufficiently
contextual).
250. See Sergio Puig, No Right Without a Remedy: Foundations of Investor-State
Arbitration, 35 PA. J. INT'L L. 829, 848 (2014) (highlighting the triple function of remedies
in investor-state arbitration for investment law more generally).
251. See SALACUSE, supra note 5, at 335 (discussing the importance of dispute
resolution from a drafter's perspective).
252. See LASSWELL & MCDOUGAL, supra note 28, at 28.
253. The discussion has flared particularly in the context of jurisdictional
invocations of most-favored-nation clauses in bilateral investment treaties. For
articulations by state-centered arbitrators, see Impregilo SpA v. Arg. Republic, ICSID
Case No. ARB/07/17, Stern Dissent (June 21, 2011), IC 498 (2011). For a discussion of
this jurisprudence, see SOURGENS, supra note 27, at 150-56.
254. See id.
255. See Int'l Law Comm'n, Rep. on the Work of its Fifth-Eighth Session, U.N.
Doc. A/61/10 (2006), at 366-80 (discussing the "Guiding Principles Applicable to
Unilateral Declarations of States Capable of Creating Legal Obligations") [hereinafter
ILC Guiding Principles]; Nuclear Tests, supra note 245, at 267.
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law.256 Quite to the contrary, diplomatic statements are presumptively
puffery-political statements made to support a state's foreign policy
or appeal to a domestic audience.257 For instance, the promise made by
then-Senator Obama to close prison camps at Guantanamo during his
2008 presidential campaign could not reasonably give rise to a cause of
action for breach of contract even though the prison camps remain open
at the time of writing, some seven years later.258
Promising to submit disputes relating to a promise to submit to
international review of stat conduct is clear evidence that the state
sought to incur a legal obligation.2 59 It assumes that the underlying
promise can give rise to a legal dispute in one form or another (as
opposed to a purely political disagreement).26 0 As a matter of classic
international law, this entails that the promise creates some form of
legal right.261 In other words, a dispute resolution provision is a signal
that the statement can in fact reasonably be relied upon.262 The
inclusion of a dispute resolution clause therefore constitutes a
sufficient condition for the creation of an international legal obligation
by means of a unilateral act: it signals the intent on the part of the
state making it to create international legal rights in the recipient and
makes reliance by the recipient on such a representation reasonable. 263
Dispute resolution also defines the scope of intended
beneficiaries.264 Not every person can submit a claim for breach of a
unilateral act;26 5 rather, only the addressee-the intended beneficiary
256. See ILC Guiding Principles, supra note 255, at 370 (noting the importance of
finding an intent to be bound).
257. See id. at 377 (explaining that a state act creates a legal obligation "only if it
is stated in clear and specific terms").
258. See Janet Cooper Alexander, The Law-Free Zone and Back Again, 2013 U.
ILL. L. REV. 551, 570-85 (2013) (discussing the legal implications of the promise to close
the Guantanamo camps); Missy Ryan & Adam Goldman, Time Is Running Out for
Obama to Fulfill Promise to Close Guantanamo, WASH. POST (Oct. 7, 2015), https://ww
w.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/time-is-running-out-for-obama-to-fulfill-
promise-to-close-guantanamo/2015/10/07/0d42dd20-6778-11e5-9223-70cb36460919_stor
y.html [https://perma.cc/4KE7-XQ63] (archived Sept. 29, 2016) (detailing current
progress on President Obama's campaign promise).
259. See HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 143 (1952) (noting
the centrality of dispute resolution provisions for the bestowal of rights on non-state
actors in international law).
260. See CAMPBELL McLACHLAN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
ARBITRATION: SUBSTANTIVE PRINCIPLES 45-57 (2007) (analyzing the predominant
dispute resolution provisions included in international investment agreements and
noting the centrality of submission of legal disputes).
261. See Certain Property (Liech. v. Ger.), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. Rep. 6, ¶ 24 (Feb.
10) (defining "legal dispute" in international law).
262. See ILC Guiding Principles, supra note 255, at 370 (linking unilateral acts
to the reliance interests they create).
263. See KELSEN, supra note 259, at 143 (noting the centrality of dispute
resolution provisions for the bestowal of rights on non-state actors in international law).
264. See ILC Guiding Principles, supra note 255, at 376 (noting that unilateral
acts can be addressed to specific recipients or the international community at large).
265. Id.
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of the act-may reasonably rely on it.2 6 6 A dispute resolution provision
typically identifies either directly or by specific description who may
bring a claim. 267 The dispute resolution therefore identifies the specific
addressee, namely a specific investor or class of investors.26 8 It
identifies not only that someone may reasonably rely on a promise or
representation, but who may reasonably rely.2 69
A unilateral act approach therefore showcases the constitutive
dimension of including international dispute resolution clauses,
benefiting foreign investors in both investment treaties and
investment contracts.270 Their inclusion creates a new kind of reliance-
based right and a process to enforce it,271 and anchors this legal right
in international law.272 But, it also expands the scope of international
law to global non-state actors, going beyond the normal scope of state-
to-state international law proper.2 73
B. Unilateral Acts and Non-State Actors
The unilateral act approach explains and further refines the
common trope that the dispute resolution clause "internationalizes"
the obligations of the state to the investor.274 The dispute resolution
clause anchors the legal obligations incurred by the state in
international law;275 it signals a unilateral act.27 6 But, the obligation
to the investor, though it is anchored in international law (i.e., the law
between states), leaves behind the state-to-state context of
266. Id.




270. See LASSWELL & MCDOUGAL, supra note 28, at 28-32.
271. See Daniel Davison-Vecchione, Beyond the Forms of Faith: Pacta Sunt
Servanda nd Loyalty, 16 GERMAN L.J. 1163, 1167-68 (2015) (discussing that unilateral
acts do not require actual reliance and are anchored in good faith); Sourgens, supra note
227, at 22-23 (explaining that reliance, in other words, refers to objective reliance
interests of like-situated third parties rather than subjective reliance by the addressee
of the statement).
272. See KELSEN, supra note 259, at 143 (noting the centrality of dispute
resolution provisions for the bestowal of rights on non-state actors in international law).
273. See Rafael Domingo, The Crisis of International Law, 42 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 1543, 1548 (2009) ("For all the prestigious internationalists' recent efforts
to address nuances of the issue in standard legal texts, international law continues to be
mainly a law between states-one in which the person occupies a secondary, even
peripheral, place.").
274. See Julien Cantegreil, The Audacity of the Texaco/Calasiatic Award: Rend-
Jean Dupuy and the Internationalization of Foreign Investment Law, 22 EUR. J. INT'L L.
441, 445 (2011) (articulating the link between internationalization and the arbitration
clause in early oil and gas arbitration awards).




international law.277 It becomes one strand in a supernational web of
legal obligations between states and non-state actors.
For unilateral acts to anchor legal obligations to non-state actors,
international law must permit states to incur legal obligations to non-
state actors. If international law did not permit such a creation of
rights, any promise by the state to non-state actors could be retracted
upon consent of the non-state actor's home country.2 78 This would
undermine a key purpose of states when entering the global
marketplace.279
The law of unilateral acts is unique in that it recognizes that
states can bind themselves to non-state actors as a matter of classic
international law.280 The framework convention for much of investor-
state arbitration-the ICSID Convention drafted under the auspices of
the World Bank in the early 1960s-sought assurance that state
consents to arbitration made by states to investors would constitute an
international legal obligation of the states making them. 281 The
answer was in the affirmative, and the basis the drafters provided was
that consents constituted internationally binding unilateral acts of
state.282
Anchoring a state's legal obligations in classic international law is
important because it frames state liability in a familiar way for the
state incurring the obligation. It remains within a legal context that a
state habitually follows in ordinary diplomatic correspondence.2 83 The
unilateral act lens thus is deferential to state expectations, as
demanded by more critical observers.284
But it is also this international legal nature of the right in
question that gives the investor pragmatic comfort. What if the host
state fails to comply with its legal obligation? There would be
preciously little an investor could do with a domestic legal right against
the host state if the host state's judiciary refuses to cooperate.285 A
277. See Domingo, supra note 273, at 1548.
278. See generally Roberts 2015, supra note 26, at 368.
279. See Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 16, at 71 (noting the intention to attract
capital and technology as a key state motivator).
280. See Reisman & Arsanjani, supra note 33, at 414-15 (discussing unilateral
acts in the investment treaty context); see generally Caron, supra note 33 (discussing
unilateral acts in the context of consents to arbitration in legislation).
281. See Broches, supra note 32, at 2.
282. See Note by the President o the Executive Director, (Dec. 28, 1961), in 2
HISTORY OF ICSID CONVENTION 5 (1968) ("Jurisdiction might be conferred on the Center
either by a unilateral declaration of a State agreeing in advance to the submission of
particular types of disputes to arbitration or conciliation by the Center, or by agreement
between a State and a particular investor.").
283. See SURYA PRAKEsH SHARMA, TERRITORIAL ACQUISITIONS, DISPUTES AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 206-07 (1997) (discussing unilateral acts in the context of
diplomatic correspondence on the status of Greenland).
284. See MONTT, supra note 25.
285. See generally Saipem S.p.A. v. Bangl., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/7, Award
(June 30, 2009), IIC 378 (2009) (discussing such a scenario and the use of investor-state
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transnational legal right is also far from self-executing: it too requires
judicial cooperation from the judiciary of the states in which a
transnational award debtor holds assets.286 If an investor holds
international legal rights, this problem can be mitigated.28 7 As
scholarship has demonstrated, states comply with their international
legal obligations because there are existing authoritative processes
that internalize compliance demands with international legal
obligations.288 Although lacking formal international legal capacity,
unilateral acts are transformative because the investor can now benefit
from these processes, which range from purely state-to-state
international legal prescriptions to state-to-person supernational
applications.
The point is less metaphysical than it might at first appear. By
signing onto framework conventions for the recognition of arbitral
awards, much of the global community has set up a ready process for
the enforcement of legal rights.289 The investor is in possession of an
international legal right from the host state and a matching legal
enforcement remedy against each and every host-state member of
these framework conventions.290 A failure to enforce this legal right
may, under the right circumstances, give rise to additional claims
against the non-enforcing state.29 1 These third states in effect step in
to support the performance of the original sovereign obligation of the
host state by making available enforcement mechanisms in their
respective jurisdictions in case of nonperformance. In so many ways,
states thus act as guarantors for the performance of awards against
sovereign award debtors. The combination of the unilateral act of the
host state and acts by third states standing for its performance is a
particularly powerful signal to the investor that the international legal
rights granted by the state have monetary value.
The flexibility of unilateral acts to cover non-state-actor
international legal rights meaningfully sets it apart from existing
analytic lenses.29 2 The treaty lens assumes, incorrectly, that an
investor has the treaty capacity to enter into conventional obligations
arbitration to address it).
286. See BLACKABY ET AL., supra note 69, at 607 ("[J]f the losing party fails to
carry out an award, the winning party needs to take steps to enforce performance of it.").
287. See generally Teddy Baldwin et al., Limits to the Enforcement of ICSID
Awards, 23 J. INT'L. ARB. 1 passim (2006).
288. See Koh, supra note 223, at 203-05.
289. See BLACKABY ET AL., supra note 69, at 617-60 (discussing the predominant
treaty enforcement regimes).
290. See id.
291. Compare Saipem S.p.A. v. Bangl., supra note 285, ¶ 133 (claim for treaty
breach premised upon non-enforcement of arbitral award successful), with GEA Group
Aktiengesellschaft v. Ukr., ICSID Case No. ARB/08/16, Award, ¶ 237 (Mar. 31, 2011),
IC 487 (2011) (claim for treaty breach premised upon non-enforcement of arbitral award
unsuccessful).
292. See supra Part II.
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with a state under international law.293 The transnational ens blocks
from view the fact that, without more, states may well be excused from
performing "simple" contractual rights by operation of the act of state
doctrine.294 The administrative lens wrongly argues that investment
arbitration sets up international administrative agencies-agencies
whose decisions would have immediate legal implications beyond a
specific case.295 The unilateral act lens, for the first time, explains how
and why a state could create meaningful obligations to a non-state
actor, renders them enforceable for the investor's benefit, and
maintains a focus on the specific relationship between the host state
as the maker of a unilateral act and the investor as its addressee.
C. Contextual Construction of Unilateral Acts
Unilateral acts protect two kinds of reliance interests: first,
jurisprudence confirms that unilateral acts protect reasonable
subjective reliance interests when such reliance is present;296 second,
international courts and tribunals will impose liability when a third
party similarly situated to the party bringing a claim would have so
relied.297 Such reliance interests are context-specific.298
The construction of unilateral acts looks beyond the text of the
instrument to all factors giving rise to reliance interests.299
Construction naturally begins with the text of the instrument,30 0 but
it also includes contextual factors outside of the four corners of the
documents that evidence the intent and reception of the unilateral acts
in question.3 01 This focus on context significantly distinguishes the
construction of unilateral acts from the interpretation of treaty
instruments-an interpretation that is formally confined to the text of
the treaty itself.302
Focus on reliance interests takes into account host-state needs
and relative position. The "circumstances attending their making" are
central to interpreting the intent of the state making a unilateral
act.303 Such "circumstances" include the motive for making the act and
293. See supra subsection I.A.3.
294. See supra subsection I.A.1.
295. See supra subsection I.A.2.
296. CHRISTIAN ECKART, PROMISES OF STATES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAw 206-
07 (2012).
297. Id. at 209-11.
298. ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND How
WE USE IT 36 (1994) ("A unilateral act is either binding or not, depending upon all the
circumstances and whether it was intended to create a legal obligation between the
parties.").




303. Nuclear Tests, supra note 245, 1 51.
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the general position of the state,304 which are sufficiently capacious to
account for the deference given by international tribunals to a host-
state's developmental status in interpreting the scope of the obligation
the host state was likely willing to incur.3 05
Focus on reliance interests also takes into account host-state
conduct in addressing these needs. Conduct indicating an intention to
induce or entice investment may well be relevant to overcoming even
host-state developmental statuS.306 The measure of such conduct vis-
a-vis the state's needs and relative position is measured by reference
to the likely reaction by the intended recipients.307 The more emphatic
the conduct, the more pronounced its effects.
Investor conduct is also important to interpreting reliance
interests. Proof that conduct did in fact provoke reliance on the part of
some actors is directly relevant to the scope of the intended message.30 8
If the recipient community at large would have or did react to the state,
it supports the finding that an obligation was incurred.309 This makes
immediately relevant an investor's own due diligence in making
investment decisions, as the investor only receives protections
commensurate with a reasonable investor. 310
The construction of unilateral acts confirms that host-state
obligations must be viewed, not in the abstract, but with a full view to
all relevant conduct. Obligations are inferred by balancing the position
and experience of the host state against the reception its conduct
received or ought to have received. Such analysis is, by definition, fact-
specific.3 1 1 When two tribunals interpret the same language differently
they are not necessarily inconsistent, as might appear from a purely
linguistic perspective, but rather appropriately sensitive to different
304. Id. 1 49.
305. See Generation Ukraine, Inc. v. Ukr., ICSID Case No. ARB/00/9, Award, ¶
20.37 (Sept. 16, 2003), IIC 116 (2003); Muchlinski, supra note 242, at 545.
306. See Rumeli Telekom, supra note 243, ¶¶ 615-18 (holding that state
mechanisms lacking transparency violated legitimate expectations when those
mechanisms operated in derogation of specifically negotiated investment contract
cancellation mechanisms).
307. See Nuclear Tests, supra note 245, ¶ 51.
308. Id. ¶ 51.
309. See id.
310. See MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. v. Republic of Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7,
Award, ¶ 178 (May 25, 2004), IIC 174 (2004).
311. See Stanmir Alexandrov, Remarks, in 2 INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 205 (Ian Laird & Todd Weiler eds., 2009) ("My second point is,
okay, are there really inconsistencies? And let me focus on three areas here. First of all,
on the facts, my argument is that the outcome of the case is determined by the facts. And
I have that at other forums, and I want to say it here again. Many of those who comment
on awards and focus on the legal conclusions of the tribunal and completely ignore the
facts of the case. If anybody is willing to do an exercise, just read the facts of the case
from an award as established by a tribunal, not as alleged by the parties, but as
established by the tribunal. Then stop reading and take a guess at what the outcome
is ... and I will posit to you that, in nine out of ten cases, you will guess right.").
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record contexts.312 In other words, the unilateral act perspective is
more accurate than alternative lenses because it can make sense of the
contextual analysis already adopted by investment tribunals.31 3
D. Deference to Governmental Action
Anchoring supernational law in unilateral acts permits an
appropriate, context-sensitive conception of arbitral deference to
governmental acts. Unilateral acts, as a general rule, will be construed
restrictively.314 As noted by the International Court of Justice, "[w]hen
States make statements by which their freedom of action is to be
limited" outside of the conventional treaty setting "restrictive
interpretation is called for."3 1 5
Jurisprudence has resulted in an exception to such deference:
unilateral acts made pursuant to a treaty.316 In this context, the
unilateral acts in question are considered clear and determinative
because of the conventional link.3 1 7 It is no longer a question of
whether the state sought to incur an obligation.3 1 8 By linking the
undertaking to a treaty, the state has unequivocally communicated as
much.319
The principal unilateral acts, on which an investor relies, have
been made pursuant to a treaty-the instrument containing
arbitration consents. These consents were given pursuant to the
framework conventions that provide for arbitration, such as the ICSID
Convention.320 They may themselves be part of a treaty-or given
pursuant to host-state legislation or contract.321 These instruments are
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. See ILC Guiding Principles, supra note 255, at 377 ("In the case of doubt as
to the scope of the obligations resulting from such a declaration, such obligations must
be interpreted in a restrictive manner.").
315. Nuclear Tests, supra note 245, ¶ 44.
316. See, e.g., Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. (U.K. v. Iran), Judgment, 1952 I.C.J. Rep. 93,
105 (July 22); Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Can.), Judgment, 1998 I.C.J. Rep. 432, 1¶
47-49 (Dec. 4); Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt,
ICSID Case No. ARB/84/3, Decision on Jurisdiction, 1 107 (Apr. 14, 1988); Mobil
Corporation, Venezuela Holdings B.V. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venez., ICSID Case No.
ARB/07/27, Decision on Jurisdiction, 11 90-94 (June 10, 2010), IIC 435 (2010); Cemex
Caracas Investments B.V. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venez., ICSID Case No ARB/08/15,
Decision on Jurisdiction, J¶ 80-88 (Dec. 30, 2010), IIC 470 (2010); Tidewater Inc. v.
Bolivarian Republic of Venez., ICSID Case No. ARB/10/5, Decision on Jurisdiction,
¶¶ 101-02 (Feb. 8, 2013), IIC 573 (2013); Michael D. Nolan & Frederic G. Sourgens,
Limits of Consent, in LIBER AMICORUM BERNARDO CREMADES 873-911 (M. Fernandez-
Ballesteros & David Arias eds., 2010).




321. See id. at 379-80.
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not, and should not be, interpreted restrictively. 322 Rather, they should
be interpreted in good faith and in keeping with the contextual lens
otherwise appropriate for unilateral acts.323
Other unilateral acts relied on by investors may or may not be
made pursuant to a treaty.324 The investor may alternatively rely on
administrative acts or representations by state entities.32 5 These
entities may be unaware of the larger international implications of
their pronouncements, whether singularly or cumulatively,326 thus,
when international legal significance is attached to such
representations, caution is appropriate.327
Arbitral deference given to administrative acts outside of the
conventional context is not a symptom of the emergence of a global
administrative law but of restrictive interpretation of a certain kind of
unilateral act.3 28 These acts may not have independent legal force or
may only be given limited contextual weight precisely because an
investor would not reasonably independently rely on them.32 9 When
there is doubt about whether an investor would so rely, the rule in
favor of the host state is prudent so as to encourage appropriate
investor diligence and clarity in its communications with the host
state.33 0 The point, in other words, is not an assumption of particular
state competency (which underlies the administrative law rationale)
but a premise that communications may be given too great a
significance in light of the lack of clarity and international competence
of the governmental counterparty.33 1
Here again, the unilateral act perspective is more accurate than
alternative lenses because it can make sense of the levels of deference
to state conduct visible in the jurisprudence. To the extent that the
investor relies on an act made pursuant to a treaty, tribunals will give
little to no deference to state action or interpretation.332 The further
afield from such acts that state conduct ventures-such as
322. See id.
323. See id. at 377.
324. See Reisman & Arsanjani, supra note 33, at 419 (noting potential investor
reliance upon unilateral acts of high government officials).
325. See id.
326. See Parkerings Compagniet AS v. Republic of Lith., ICSID Case No.
ARB/05/8, Award, TT 305-07 (Aug. 14, 2007), TIC 302 (2007) (discussing the implications
of conduct and representations of city officials addressing pricing structures for a parking
garage).
327. See ILC Guiding Principles, supra note 255, at 377.
328. See supra subsection I.A.2.
329. See ILC Guiding Principles, supra note 255, at 377 (asserting in the
commentary that unilateral declarations "must be interpreted in a restrictive manner").
330. Parkerings-Compagniet AS v. Republic of Lith., supra note 326, 11 306-9;
see MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. v. Republic of Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7, Award, 1 178
(May 25, 2004), IIC 174 (2004) ("[T]he Tribunal considers that the Claimants should bear
the consequences of their own actions as experienced businessmen.").
331. ILC Guiding Principles, supra note 255, at 377.
332. See id. at 380.
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administrative correspondence with local officials-the more
restrictive the tribunal's approach.333 This approach makes little sense
from a treaty or transnational aw perspective. 33 It also tends to invert
administrative competence rationales for administrative deference, as
a federal agency acting with due deliberation certainly is more
competent than a local official acting with all the haste and care of
routine correspondence.33 5 However, this approach makes a lot of sense
from the point of view of unilateral acts.
V. THE TRANSNATIONAL GOOD FAITH ELEMENT OF
SUPERNATIONAL LAW
So far, the focus of this Article has followed traditional lines of
scholarship. The state is liable to the non-state actor under
international law for an infraction of the investor's legal right or
interest.336 This analysis, however, is incomplete-it does not provide
a means to understand what legal obligations the non-state actor
incurs.
This question is at first perplexing. While counterclaims are
straightforwardly possible in contractual arbitration, the current
scholarly focus rests on disputes arising under treaty instruments. 337
How could an investor have incurred an obligation under a treaty
between the investor's home state and the host state to the investment,
a treaty to which the investor never became a party in its own right?338
The unilateral act approach shifts this focus. Consistent with
jurisprudence, particularly in the natural resource sector, the stark
dividing line between treaty arbitration and contract arbitration
disappears.3 39 The host-state's obligation to the investor under a
concession agreement and under a treaty are functionally and formally
the same: both are unilateral acts by the state.340 It is natural that a
state would secure for itself rights under a concession agreement in
consideration for the obligation it incurs vis-&-vis the foreign investor.
333. See supra subsection I.A.2.
334. See supra Section I.A.
335. See id.
336. See supra Part IV.
337. See supra Section II.A.
338. See Roussalis v. Rom., ICSID Case No. ARB/06/1, Award, ¶¶ 868-69 (Dec. 7,
2011), ICC 516 (2011).
339. See supra Part TV; see also Perenco Ecuador Ltd. v. Republic of Ecuador,
ICSID Case No. ARB/08/6, Environmental Counterclaim (Aug. 11, 2015), IIC 699 (based
upon a treaty and a concession agreement); Burlington Res. Inc. v. Republic of Ecuador,
ICSID Case No ARB/08/5, Liability, I¶} 513-18 (Dec. 14, 2012) (interweaving production
sharing contract and treaty analysis to determine whether an internationally wrongful
act occurred); Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, supra note 82, 1 345
(combining transnational oilfield practices, contract standards and treaty standards to
determine whether an internationally wrongful act occurred).
340. See supra Part IV.
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Given that foreign investors may well operate by means of thinly
capitalized special purpose vehicles in the state issuing the concession,
the host state may insist on making the state's own rights under the
concession actionable beyond the boundaries of the host state. There
must thus be a global legal process that gives effect to and permits a
sound conception of these rights of state against the investor. This legal
process should similarly be applicable in the context of disputes that
arise in the absence of a contract between the investor and the state.
It is when this process is combined with the process of state liability
that a true supernational legal process arises to transcend the
international legal focus on state liability and the transnational egal
focus on investor rights.
A. The Constitutive Function of Dispute Resolution, Redux
Proper analysis of the respective "internationalized"
supernational rights of states and obligations of investors again must
begin with the means by which to make them actionable and by which
their violation may be remedied.341 Analogously to international
investor rights, a state has an "internationalized" right against the
investor when it has the ability to seek a remedy for a violation
internationally.342 Just like in the context of the investor's rights, the
key provision to determine whether such an international forum exists
is the arbitration clause.34 3
In the context of concession agreements or other contracts, this
question is non-controversial.344 Typically, both the state and the
investor agree to submit disputes arising out of or relating to the
contract to arbitration.345 The state has a straightforward right to
341. See id.
342. See supra Part IV.
343. SCHREUER ET AL., supra note 74, at 756.
344. Controversy may arise if the arbitration clause calls for ICSID arbitration as
the ICSID Convention requires an additional jurisdictional hurdle that the dispute arise
directly out of an investment in keeping with Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention. In
those instances, it may be the case that allegations of violation of purely domestic law
may not satisfy this requirement. DUGAN ET AL., supra note 21, at 153-54. This
conclusion is currently contested in the jurisprudence. See Roussalis v. Rom., supra note
338 (discussing the dissenting opinion of Professor Reisman ("In rejecting ICSID
jurisdiction over counterclaims, a neutral tribunal - which was, in fact, selected by the
claimant - perforce directs the respondent State to pursue its claims in its own courts
where the very investor who had sought a forum outside the state apparatus is now
constrained to become the defendant. (And if an adverse judgment ensues, that erstwhile
defendant might well transform to claimant again, bringing another BIT claim.) Aside
from duplication and inefficiency, the sorts of transaction costs which counter-claim and
set-off procedures work to avoid, it is an ironic, if not absurd, outcome, at odds, in my
view, with the objectives of international investment law.")). In any event, the majority
of significant contractual arbitrations between investors and host-state entities are not
subject to ICSID arbitration. See Goldhaber et al., supra note 4 (listing the fora for
contractual arbitrations).
345. A typical example is the arbitration clause included in the Association
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bring claims against the investor.346 This right may go beyond the
rights actionable under breach of contract; for example, in the
commercial context, words such as "relating to" or "connected to" in a
contract's arbitration clause permit tribunals to hear any form of tort
or statutory claim.347
In the treaty context, the question is more complicated. Some
treaties may well echo the broad formulation used in contracts.348 In
such a case, the state is consenting to arbitrate any claims arising out
of or related to the investment.349 Two treaties that contain arbitration
provisions deemed by jurisprudence to be, in principle, sufficiently
broad to permit such counterclaims are the Dutch-Czech and the
Mongolian-Russian bilateral investment treaties.3 5 0
Agreement between ExxonMobil's subsidiary Mobil Cerro Negro Ltd. and Venezuela's
national oil company, PDVSA. See Mobil Cerro Negro, Ltd. v. Petroleos de Venez., S.A.,
ICC Arbitration Case No. 15416/JFR/CA, Award, ¶ 5.2.2 (Dec. 23, 2011) (quoting the
arbitration clause in full).
346. See id. 1 803 ("For the same reasons for which the Tribunal has accepted its
jurisdiction above regarding the claims raised by Claimant, in view of the very broad
wording of the arbitration clause in Article 18.2 AA, the Tribunal also has jurisdiction
over the counterclaims raised.").
347. See BLACKABY ET AL., supra note 69, at 79.
348. See Agreement between the Swiss Confederation and the Republic of
Venezuela Concerning the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Switz.-
Venez., art. 9, Nov. 18, 1993, IC-BT 300, http://www.wipo.intledocs/lexdocs/treaties/en/
ch-ve/trtch ve001en.pdf [https://perma.cc/8FS6-EG2Z] (archived Oct. 2, 2016)
[hereinafter Agreement between the Swiss Confederation and the Republic of Venezuela]
(submitting to dispute resolution including arbitration "disputes between a Contracting
Parties and an investor of the other Contracting Party") (author's translation).
349. See id.
350. See Saluka Investments B.V. v. Czech Republic, Jurisdiction, ¶ 21 (May 7,
2004), IIC 209 (2004) ("All disputes between one Contracting Party and an investor of
the other Contracting Party concerning an investment of the latter shall, if possible, be
settled amicably. . . . Each Contracting Party consents to submit a dispute referred to in
paragraph (1) of this Article, to an arbitral tribunal, if the dispute has not been settled
amicably within [a stated] period."). The tribunal affirmed that the language was
sufficiently broad to permit counterclaims in principle. Id. ¶ 39 ("The Tribunal agrees
that, in principle, the jurisdiction conferred upon it by Article 8, particularly when read
with Article 19.3, 19.4 and 21.3 of the UNCITRAL Rules, is in principle wide enough to
encompass counterclaims. The language of Article 8, in referring to 'All disputes,' is wide
enough to include disputes giving rise to counterclaims, so long, of course, as other
relevant requirements are also met. The need for a dispute, if it is to fall within the
Tribunal's jurisdiction, to be 'between one Contracting Party and an investor of the other
Contracting Party' carries with it no implication that Article 8 applies only to disputes
in which it is an investor which initiates claims."); Paushok v. Government of Mong.,
supra note 36, 1 689 ("[The Mongolian-Russian treaty] states in particular that 'the
jurisdiction conferred upon it (the tribunal) by Article 8, particularly when read with
Article 19.3, 19.4 of the UNCITRAL Rules, is in principle wide enough to encompass
counterclaims. The language of Article 8, in referring to "all disputes" is wide enough to
include disputes giving rise to counterclaims, so long, of course, as other relevant
requirements are also met.' Article 8 of the Saluka BIT is similar to Article 6 of the
Treaty, the first one referring to 'all Disputes' while the second refers to "disputes" and
there is no reason to make a difference between the two.").
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Such provisions on their face confirm that absolute opposition to
investor liability under investment treaties would be artificially
limiting.3 5 1 The dispute resolution provision communicates an
intention to accept and incur internationalized liability. 352 When the
investor matches this provision with its own consent to arbitration, the
investor communicates the same intention as the state.35 3
The question is more complicated when the treaty language is
more narrowly tailored. Some treaty consents appear to be limited to
disputes arising under the treaty.354 In such instances, the question
arises whether the scope of the arbitration consent is broadened by
reference to the arbitration instruments pursuant to which it is
given.3 55 As counterclaim skeptics concede, many arbitration rules in
fact expressly contemplate that the parties consent to a tribunal
hearing counterclaims that arise out of the same transaction and
occurrence as the main claim. 356 This incorporation may well operate
to expand even narrowly drafted arbitration consents-although the
construction of the consent and the nexus between the counterclaim
and the treaty claim will remain an issue of delicate contextualization
in each case.35 7
In all cases, the dispute resolution provision is constitutive of the
internationalized reliance interests the parties can have of each other.
These interests do not arise as a matter of legal absolutes; rather, they
require a careful study of the arbitration consents themselves, in light
of their full context. In principle, however, there is no bar to stating
counterclaims if they are appropriately articulated as a matter of
applicable law.
B. Applicable Law
Even with jurisdiction established, counterclaims by states
against investors raise the question of which law would be applicable
351. See DUGAN ET AL., supra note 21, at 153-54.
352. See Agreement between the Swiss Confederation and the Republic of
Venezuela, supra note 348, at art. 9.
353. See Nolan & Sourgens, supra note 316, at 4.
354. Roussalis v. Rom., supra note 338, 1¶ 868-69.
355. See See Roussalis v. Rom., ICSID Case No. ARB/06/1, Declaration of W.
Michael Reisman (Nov. 28, 2011), ICC 516 (2011) [hereinafter Reisman Declaration]
("[I]n my view, when the States Parties to a BIT contingently consent, inter alia, to
ICSID jurisdiction, the consent component of Article 46 of the Washington Convention
is ipso facto imported into any ICSID arbitration which an investor then elects to
pursue.").
356. See DUGAN ET AL., supra note 21, at 153-54.
357. See Oxus Gold PLC v. Republic of Uzb., supra note 242, ¶¶ 948-53 ("The
wording of Article 8(1) of the BIT is for this Arbitral Tribunal a clear indication that the
Parties' consent to arbitration under the BIT only cover claims from investors against
the host State, but not claims from the host State against he investors, to the possible
exception of counter-claims having a close connection with the investor's claims, as
mentioned below (see below, para. 951)."); Reisman Declaration, supra note 355.
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to the counterclaim itself. Various sources of applicable law are
theoretically conceivable, including the host-state's law and the law
chosen by the parties in a concession contract. The first option would
allow the assertion, by the host state, of violations of its own laws in
counterclaims.3 5 8 This is a typical manner in which states frame their
counterclaims. 35
With few exceptions, arbitral jurisprudence has rejected such
assertions on a jurisdictional basis: disputes of violations of host-state
law should be tried in the competent (administrative) fora rather than
the international fora.360 This stated reasoning is applied
asymmetrically, however, as investor-state tribunals do in fact accept
claims by an investor premised upon a host-state's applicable law but
reject same or similar host-state claims.361 Thought through to its
logical conclusion, such jurisprudence comes dangerously close to
denying the state equal treatment because it gives only one party
access to redress. Equal treatment of the litigants is a core aspect of
international due process.362 Such due process failures can lead to the
annulment or setting aside of a resultant award.363 It is therefore
prudent to analyze the jurisprudence in question in more functional
terms to avoid the consequence of a due process failure.364
A more charitable explanation of this jurisprudence is to cast it as
other than strictly "jurisdictional" in the sense that tribunals are not
empowered to hear claims raised by states as a matter of law (i.e., that
358. See DUGAN ET AL., supra note 21, at 153-54.
359. For a recent example, see Paushok v. Government of Mong., supra note 36,
1 678. For a discussion of earlier jurisprudence, see DUGAN ET AL., supra note 21, at 153-
54.
360. For a case applying the law of the host state (as incorporated in the governing
contract) as applied in country, see Perenco Ecuador Ltd. v. Republic of Ecuador, supra
note 20, ¶J 364 n.898 ("[T]he Tribunal must seek to apply Ecuadorian law as the
Ecuadorian courts have applied it."). As discussed below, it is at the very least arguable
that the decision was ultimately motivated by an internationalist view of liability: the
tribunal notes that "proper environmental stewardship has assumed great importance
in today's world." Id. ¶ 34. It then justifies its reliance upon Ecuadorian applicable law
by express reference to a state's "wide latitude under international law to prescribe and
adjust its environmental aws, standards, and policies in response to changing views and
a deeper understanding of the risks posed by various activities, including those of
extractive industries such as oilfields." Id. 1 35 (emphasis added). The tribunal's factual
conclusion was that the claimant materially deceived the Ecuadorian government about
its environmental compliance. Id. ¶ 447. As discussed below, such conduct would be
inconsistent with transnational obligations of good faith- and not in compliance with
international prescriptions (as opposed to purely municipal ones).
361. See DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 147, at 169-75 (analyzing umbrella
clause jurisprudence); NORAH GALLAGHER & WENHUA SHAN, CHINESE INVESTMENT
TREATIES: POLICIES AND PRACTICE 220 (2009) (noting the municipal law predicate of
umbrella clause claims).
362. See R. DOAK BISHOP & SILVIA M. MARCHILI, ANNULMENT UNDER THE ICSID
CONVENTION 130-34 (2012) (analyzing jurisprudence establishing that equality of the
parties is an international due process principle).
363. See id.
364. See id. at 133 (noting the functional analysis required for annulment).
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tribunals categorically lack jurisdiction to do so).365 Tellingly, the
influential reasoning for denying counterclaims, announced in Amco v.
Indonesia, is that legal disputes concerning rights and obligations that
are applicable to legal or natural persons who are within the reach of
a host-state's jurisdiction "in principle fall to be decided by the
appropriate procedures in the relevant jurisdiction unless the general
law generates an investment dispute under the Convention."366 This
jurisprudence ultimately draws a distinction between types of
disputes, namely host-state legal disputes and investment disputes.3 6 7
The Amco distinction assumes that some, but not all, host-state
legal disputes "generate[] an investment dispute."3 68 The case, as pled
by Indonesia, lacked a necessary element:369 the link between the host-
state law asserted to have been violated and a truly transnational, or,
more precisely, supernational dispute. This treatment is consistent
with the now-prevalent understanding of umbrella clauses invoked by
investors, namely that trivial and/or commercial breaches of contract
by the host state are not a predicate for liability.avo In both instances,
the relevant element is the applicable law, not the jurisdiction. It
asserts that there is an applicable law or legal process that a claim or
counterclaim failed to satisfy. In the counterclaim context, the
jurisprudence has, so far, failed to elaborate in detail what the
applicable law or legal process is.
Recasting this jurisprudence in terms of applicable law can benefit
from the related choice-of-law discourse in international commercial
arbitrations.3 7 1 Just as in the investor-state context, the jurisprudence
has rejected the strict use of conflict-of-law rules for a similar reason:
these rules do not take into account the "transnational" or
"internationalized" legal character of the transaction at issue.372 This
line of arbitral jurisprudence and scholarship instead applies
transnational aw, that is, the law chosen by the parties as augmented
by legal principles derived by reference to comparative law research,
applicable trade usage, and factually instructive arbitral
365. The bar would operate "ratione voluntatis" or because of the scope of the
consent itself. Soufraki v. U.A.E., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/7, Annulment, T 42 (June 5,
2007), IC 297 (2002).
366. Amco Asia Corp. v. Republic of Indon., ICSID Case No. ARB/81/1,
Jurisdiction, ¶ 125 (May 10, 1988), 1 ICSID Rep. 543 (1998). For a discussion of the
impact of Amco on the later Saluka decision, see DUGAN ET AL., supra note 21, at 153-
54. For the influence of Saluka, see Paushok v. Government of Mong., supra note 36, ¶¶
689-93; SCHREUER ET AL., supra note 74, at 756.
367. See Amco Asia Corp. v. Republic of Indon., supra note 366, ¶ 125.
368. Id.
369. Id. 1 126-27.
370. See DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 147, at 169-75 (analyzing umbrella
clause jurisprudence).




jurisprudence.3 73 If states asserted counterclaims premised on
transnational or transnationalized legal principles, their claims should
overcome the hurdle created by current jurisprudence by asserting
"investment dispute[s]" as opposed to domestic regulatory
disagreements. 374
This hypothesis is consistent with investor-state jurisprudence
addressing investor misconduct in the jurisdictional context.3 75 In
order to benefit from treaty protection, an investor must often satisfy
a condition precedent set out in the treaty itself, namely that the
investor "made" the investment "in accordance with law." 376 The first
threshold question for such jurisdictional objections by host states
against claims raised by the investor is timing: When is a violation of
law jurisdictionally relevant?3 77 As treaties typically link the condition
precedent o the making or acceptance of an investment, the answer to
this first question is reasonably straightforward: only a violation of law
during the acquisition of the investment is jurisdictionally relevant.3 78
It is thus natural to surmise that investor misconduct that would have
been relevant but for its timing should be treated in the context of
claims for set-off or counterclaims by the host state.3 79
The second threshold question is more complex: What is the law
incorporated in the condition precedent of treaty protection? Just as in
the context of contractual disputes, choice-of-law principles mandate
that the law incorporated in the condition precedent is the law of the
host state. Using conflicts-of-laws terminology, one tribunal noted that
the treaty effects a renvoi (send back) to the law of the host state.38 0
But, as the same tribunal was quick to point out, this renvoi does not
operate perfectly.3 81 Rather, an investor's good faith in making the
investment would excuse a violation of host-state law in the making of
the investment.382 The law applicable to investor misconduct, just like
the law applicable to state misconduct, is "internationalized."3 8 3 The
process of internationalization in both instances (state misconduct and
373. See id. at 289-93.
374. Amco Asia Corp. v. Republic of Indon., supra note 366, 1 125.
375. For a discussion of this jurisprudence, see Rahim Moloo & Alex
Khachaturian, The Compliance with the Law Requirement in International Investment
Law, 34 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1473 passim (2011).
376. See id. at 1476-81 (analyzing treaties containing such provisions).
377. Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Services Worldwide v. Republic of the Phil.,
supra note 213, 1 345.
378. See id.
379. See MONTT, supra note 25, at 247-48.
380. See Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Services Worldwide v. Republic of the
Phil., supra note 213, ¶ 394.
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investor misconduct) relies on the same principle-the principle of good
faith.384
Investor-state arbitration has developed a nascent jurisprudence
regarding some of the relevant principles of good faith with which an
investor must comply. Most glaringly, jurisprudence establishes that
good faith, in the guise of international public policy, precludes
protection of investments acquired by means of bribes.3 8 5 Similarly,
tribunals have followed general principles of law to flesh out the idea
that good faith prohibits fraudulent conduct.386 Even in the absence of
tortiously fraudulent conduct, tribunals have held that good faith
prohibits an investor's abuse of rights in the acquisition of an
investment.3 8 7 In its most comprehensive form, good faith requires
investor due diligence proportionate to the scope of the investment; this
means learning the salient points of the host state's legal regime and
making honest and reasonable attempts, consistent with industry best
practices, to comply with that regime, as incorporated in the
investment structure.38 8
The same principles can and are straightforwardly applied in the
liability context. The core question is whether the contracting parties
conducted themselves in good faith, taking into account the specific
contractual obligations they have undertaken to one another and the
principles of applicable law they have incorporated into their bargain
or relationship by reference.3 89 To answer this question, tribunals
typically must determine whether a party abused its rights or acted
fraudulently in derogation of best industry practice or in violation of
basic international public policy. 390
The recent Perenco v. Ecuador decision functionally applied such
a rubric to its preliminary decision on Ecuador's counterclaim against
a multinational oil and gas company.39i That counterclaim concerned
384. See id.
385. See ALOYSIsus LLAMZON, CORRUPTION IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
ARBITRATION 194-98 (2014) (discussing the jurisdictional jurisprudence addressing
corruption allegations).
386. See Inceysa Vallisolente S.L. v. Republic of El Sal., ICSID Case No.
ARB/03/26, Award, I ¶ 240-44 (Aug. 2, 2006), IIC 234 (2006); Plama Consortium Ltd. v.
Republic of Bulg., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Award, ¶¶ 130-42 (Aug. 27, 2008), IIC
338 (2008).
387. See Phoenix Action Ltd. v. Republic of Bulg., ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5,
Award, J[ 101-13 (Apr. 9, 2009), IIC 367 (2009).
388. See Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Services Worldwide v. Republic of the
Phil., supra note 213, 1 396.
389. See BERGER, supra note 38, at 122 ("Objective values such as reliability,
loyalty, fairness, reasonableness and good conduct are essential elements of the
behavioral standard required from contract parties by the principle of good faith. There
is an inherent correlation between these blanket clauses and the 'discretion' of the judge
in applying the law. [They allow] the judge to escape from the application of abstract
black-letter law and to take account of the particularities of the individual cases . . .
390. See id. at 139-43.
391. Perenco Ecuador Ltd. v. Republic of Ecuador, supra note 20, ¶ 611.
202 [VOL. 50:155
SUPERNATIONAL LAW
alleged failures by the investment vehicle (and Perenco) to abide by
their environmental obligations.3 92 The tribunal tacitly concluded that
the Ecuadorian regime in fact complied with and furthered the
international goals of environmental stewardship.39 3 The tribunal
expressly concluded that operators consistently complied with this
regime.394 It was this regime-the municipal legal regime, as
consistently followed by international operators in keeping with
international legal principles on environmental protection-that the
tribunal ultimately applied.39 5 The analysis of the tribunal formally
followed a renvoi to Ecuadorian law.3 96 But it did so only after
ascertaining the importance of corporate environmental stewardship
as a matter of global practice.3 9 7 It then confirmed the existence of a
"wide latitude" within which states may adjust their environmental
regimes governing investors.39 8
The Perenco tribunal did not base its determinations on picayune
points of Ecuadorian law; rather, the Perenco tribunal determined,
premised on the claimant's internal documents, that the investor "was
less than forthcoming" with regard to its environmental compliance
efforts.3 99 Rather than further characterize the conduct in question,
the tribunal let the internal document speak for itself: "the 'State will
probably assume that we are hiding many more [environmental]
damages and will scrutinize the operations area in such for more
damages and it will probably find them.' 400 Such conduct is exactly
the kind of pronouncement hat has led to jurisdictional dismissals for
failure to abide by applicable law.4oi They are fundamentally
inconsistent not only with host-state law, but also with transnational
commercial good faith obligations to take seriously the interests and
needs of the counterparty to a transaction.402
Viewed functionally, Perenco thus stands for the legal proposition
that counterclaims that allow for a host-state remedy for an investor's
purposeful and deceitful disregard for the basic environmental
392. Id. 1 34 ("Ecuador presented the environmental counterclaim on the basis
that its experts had determined the existence of an 'environmental catastrophe' in the
two oil blocks situated in the country's Amazonian rainforest that had been worked by
the consortium under Perenco's operatorship.").
393. See id. (implying in the application of Ecuadorian law that it remains within
the stated latitude).
394. Id. 1 321 (holding that Ecuadorian law was "administered in a generally
consistent manner by regulators and operators alike") (emphasis added).
395. Id. 1 321-24.
396. Id. (holding that Ecuadorian law was to be applied to the dispute because it
presented a regulatory regime administered in a generally consistent manner by both
operators and regulators).
397. Id. 1 34.
398. Id. ¶ 35.
399. Id. ¶ 447.
400. Id.
401. See id. ¶¶ 34, 321-24.
402. See BERGER, supra note 38, at 122.
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interests of the host state, as habitually implemented by peer
investors, have legal merit.40 3 They constitute instances in which an
investor knows about the interest of the state, understands that other
like-situated investors habitually comply with the laws and
regulations codifying these interests, consciously decides to disregard
them, and then misleads its state counterparty to prevent its
understanding the full effect its actions will have.
In sum, in the context of a capacious arbitration clause-no matter
whether that clause is included in a treaty or a contract-there is an
internationalized liability regime in place for investor misconduct. This
liability regime is the mirror image of the one theorized in the context
of unilateral acts: good faith conduct. In the words of one tribunal,
BITs oblige governments to conduct their relations with foreign investors in a
transparent fashion. Some reciprocal if not identical obligations lie on the
foreign investor. One of those is the obligation to make the investment in
accordance with the host state's law. It is arguable that even an investment
which is not made in accordance with host state law may import economic
value to the host state. But that is not the only goal of this sector of
international law. Respect for the integrity of the law of the host state is also
a critical part of development and a concern of international investment
law.404
C. The Reference Point of Transnational Law
This leaves the question of how one determines the specific
content of good faith obligations of the investor to the host state in a
given context. Good faith is a largely malleable principle.
405 Good
faith-or, more precisely, the absence of good faith giving rise to
investor liability-rivals obscenity in that both are difficult to define,
but impossible to miss. 406
Current efforts in the field of international commercial law
inductively codify rules of good faith in the context of long-term
contracts.40 7  These efforts review relevant commercial
403. See id at 265.
404. See Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Services Worldwide v. Republic of the
Phil., supra note 213, ¶ 402. The Fraport decision was jurisdictional in nature; one of the
arbitrators has since expressed that the same logic may well apply beyond the strictly
jurisdictional confines of that dispute. W. Michael Reisman, Remarks, in 9 INVESTMENT
TREATY ARBITRATION AND INTERNATIONAL LAw 117 (Ian Laird et al. eds., 2016).
405. See Bernardo Cremades, Good Faith in International Arbitration, 27 AM. U.
INT'L L. REV. 761, 761, 765 (2012) ("It is difficult to find any international arbitration
award not based on, or that does not at least mention, good faith . . . nevertheless, it is
not clear what the concept of good faith actually means.").
406. See David Pozen, Constitutional Bad Faith, 129 HARV. L. REV. 885, 915
(2016) ("Because bad faith is so difficult to define and deter ex ante, courts and
commentators in non-constitutional fields have relied heavily on inductive reasoning to
fashion general rules out of concrete cases.").
407. See Harnany Veytia, The Requirement of Justice and Equity in Contracts, 69
TUL. L. REV. 1191, 1205 (1995) (discussing the principle of good faith in the "most
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jurisprudence4 08 and supplement this jurisprudence with comparative
legal research in commercial law and industry self-regulation.409 By
combining jurisprudence with general principles of commercial law
and industry practice, these efforts have assembled a sufficiently
comprehensive set of rules and principles that can be applied with
reasonable certainty to specific transactions and disputes.4 10
These transnational codification efforts serve as a useful guide in
determining the liability of the non-state actor in the supernational
context (i.e., transactions between state actors on the one hand and
foreign non-state actors on the other). These principles and rules
measure the commercial good faith of the foreign non-state actor, as
determined from an industry perspective.411 They provide guidance on
what efforts a commercial actor can be reasonably expected to
undertake, in the sense that they set a context-specific point of
reference for commercial minimum and optimum practices.4 12
The application of such transnational principles is appropriate
given the reliance interests of state actors. The reason states seek out
investment is that they have identified a policy goal that can better be
accomplished with market help.413 Sometimes, the state is incapable
or unwilling to finance the venture independently.4 14 Other times, the
state lacks commercial or technical expertise.4 15 In either instance, the
state looks for commercial actors to fill the gap between the policy goal
and policy implementation. Transnational legal principles impose
significant codification effort by international organizations" for "long-term
international contracts").
408. See id. at 1204; see also Janet Koven Levit, A Bottom-Up Approach to
International Lawmaking: The Tale of Three Trade Finance Instruments, 30 YALE J.
INT'L L. 125, 176-80 (2005) (noting the inductive lawmaking process of bottom-up
lawmaking in transnational law).
409. See Vanessa Johnson, Codification of the Lex Mercatoria: Friend or Foe?, 21
L. & Bus. REV. AM. 151, 165 (2015) (discussing the link between the UNIDROIT
Principles and general principles of law recognized in mature jurisdictions).
410. UNIVERSITY OF COLOGNE, GERMANY, TRANS-LEX.ORG, www.trans-lex.org
(last visited Oct. 26, 2016) [https://perma.cc/L9KQ-V6Y3] (archived Oct. 4, 2016)
(exemplifying the efforts to construct a collaboration of sources).
411. See BERGER, supra note 38, at 292.
412. Compare Alan Miller & Ronen Perry, Good Faith Performance, 98 IOWA L.
REV. 689, 744 (2013) (discussing good faith measures on industry minimum), with
Antonis Patrikios, Resolution of Cross-Border E-Business Disputes by Arbitration
Tribunal on the Basis of Transnational Substantive Rules of Law and E-Business Usages:
The Emergence of the Lex Mercatoria, 28 U. TOL. L. REV. 271, 293 (2006) (discussing
decisions based on self-regulation as best practices).
413. See Cass R. Sunstein, Empirically Informed Regulation, 78 U. CHI. L. REV.
1349, 1366 (2011) (noting the promise of "promoting social norms through private-public
partnerships"); SALACUSE, supra note 5, at 77 (identifying the bargain as "promise of
protection of capital in return for the prospect of more capital in the future").
414. See SALACUSE, supra note 5, at 77.
415. See id.
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liability when commercial actors act for functionally non-commercial
reasons and thereby deprive the state of its reliance interests.4 1 6
The application of such transnational principles to the liability of
commercial actors (as opposed to state actors, as previously theorized)
also appropriately reflects the reliance interests a commercial actor
could expect to induce. Commercial actors know and expect that they
will be held liable whenever they act inconsistently with basic
minimum commercial requirements, as recognized by and codified in
commercial practice.41 7 There is no reason to hold commercial actors
harmless from a violation of these minimum requirements because
they happened to contract with a state entity rather than a formally
commercial counterparty.
VI. COMBINING THE ELEMENTS OF SUPERNATIONAL LAW
The appraisal of both state and investor conduct is anchored in
good faith.418 In each case, good faith looks to the contextually
applicable understanding of the law of unilateral acts to appraise state
conduct and to transnational law to appraise commercial conduct.419
These apparently distinct phases of appraisal of state conduct and
commercial conduct must be combined into a single process. So far,
state action and commercial action have been treated in isolation for
analytical purposes.420 In the real world, state action and commercial
action cannot be isolated so neatly from one another.421 The point of a
transaction between the state and the non-state actor is that each
party to the transaction reacts to, works with, and profits from the
investment.422
The resulting process is, of necessity, cooperative and contextual.
On the transactional side, it requires communication between the
relevant actors to ascertain that policy ends and commercial goals are
effectively met.423 Failure to meet these goals requires adjustment by
both parties to retain the original bargain.424 These adjustments
require the state to be responsive to the reliance interests its conduct
has brought about425 and require the commercial actor to be responsive
to the commercial disequilibrium that new and unanticipated market
416. See Veytia, supra note 407.
417. See BERGER, supra note 38, at 292.
418. See supra Parts III-IV.
419. See id.
420. See id.
421. See LLAMZON, supra note 385, at 3-6 (explicating corruption between seeking
commercial stability and non-commercial advantage).
422. See id. at 4-5 (setting out the terms of mutual advantage of foreign
investment).
423. See DESIERTO, supra note 225, at 373-76, 382.
424. See id. at 379.
425. See supra Part IV.
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forces may have caused.426 When a dispute arises, liability could only
be imposed by taking into account the context of these cooperative
efforts.
This appraisal cannot be satisfied by simple rule application.
Supernational aw requires the engagement by state and commercial
actors of the other's ends,4 27 ends that are often incommensurate with
one another.4 28 Thus, resolving differences requires a balance of such
incommensurate ends,429 and this balance can only be struck by
reference to the weight and complexity of specific reliance interests.430
It is thus not enough to impose rules from one set of liability
principles-either unilateral acts or transnational law. Rather, these
rules must be placed in the context of specific conduct and translated
based on the entanglement of the mutual reliance interests they have
brought about.
This entanglement of mutual reliance interests of state and non-
state actors means that good faith in supernational aw is meaningfully
different in application from good faith in international or
transnational law. Conceptually, good faith always requires a respect
for, and engagement with, the different perspective of one's respective
counterparty.431 Applied to supernational law, these starting points
are radically different4 32 because they are constitutive of the value
each party can achieve: the state actor can only achieve desired policy
ends because of private participation, and the commercial actor can
only unlock monetary value because of the state's decision to
implement these policy ends.433 Thus, neither the policy end nor the
monetary value can be preferred to the other.
This divergence of good faith in application and between
supernational law and international and transnational law explains
some of the apparent inconsistency of decisions in investor-state
arbitration.434 Many commentators have pointed out that liability
decisions reached in disputes between states and non-state actors are
doctrinally inconsistent because they use incommensurate rationales
426. See supra Part V.
427. See supra Parts III-IV.
428. See DESIERTO, supra note 225, at 379 ("There has been a disquieting
automatic tendency on the part of several arbitral tribunals to equate the fair market
value of the investment as the level of compensation for breaches of the IIA that do not
amount to expropriation.").
429. See Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH.
L. REv. 779, 856-59 (1994).
430. See id.
431. See Pozen, supra note 406, at 915.
432. See supra Parts III-TV.
433. See id.
434. See Frederic G. Sourgens, Law's Laboratory: Developing International Law
on Investment Protection as Common Law, 34 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUs. 181, 203-04, 209-
10 (2014) (discussing the inconsistency of decisions in investor-state arbitration).
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in interpreting the same treaty language or contractual clause.4 35 This
inconsistency, commentators point out, creates legitimacy issues
because it creates problems of predictability in current transactional
practice and for future disputes.436
This apparent inconsistency identified in the literature is the
direct result of an appropriate application of supernational law by
tribunals. The decisions are indeed facially inconsistent. But the
differences between decisions can be fully explained by the arbitral
process-and record-leading up to them.437 This process balances the
respective reliance interests of the parties in light of the full factual
record before the tribunal.438 The tribunals then express their
conclusions in the language of the legal framework pled by the
prevailing party.439 The case law thus operationalizes a factual
balancing test without fully expressing its significance in the legal
discussion of the tribunal's ultimate holding.440 Once revealed,
however, this operational code of the arbitral process can explain the
apparent inconsistency of arbitral decisions: the inconsistency is
resolved by focusing on the narrow, factual decision-making process
within the arbitration rather than the facially general discussion of
legal authorities by tribunals in their awards.441
Such an operational code could equally support the argument that
the jurisprudence is the result of a rigged system.442 The result is
predetermined by an appreciation of facts that escapes clear doctrinal
expression by tribunals in their rationales for judgment.
Problematically, the same people are reappointed in a large number of
tribunals, meaning that the same kind of factual appreciation will
determine a growing number of cases without providing a legally
compelling rationale for each decision. This gives rise to questions of
capture.443 As the dynamics of reappointment are a proven fact of
investor-state arbitration,444 more is necessary to show that arbitral
conduct is authoritative as opposed to corrupted or rigged. One means
to do so may be to further delve into quantitative analysis of ultimate




437. See id. at 215-20.
438. See id. at 224-44.
439. See id.
440. See id.
441. See id. at 215-20.
442. See Warren, supra note 1.
443. See VAN HARTEN, supra note 91, at 167-75.
444. See Sergio Puig, Social Capital in the Arbitration Market, 25 EUR. J. INT'L L.
387, 423-24 (2014).
445. See Franck & Wylie, supra note 11, at 520-21 ("The variables most likely to
predict outcomes [in this study] were arguably case selection effects, including investor
identity and the presence of experience counsel.").
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What supernational aw theorizes, beyond the current literature,
is that there is a substantive reason for arbitral conduct.
Inconsistencies in jurisprudence do not creep up because of the
operational design of arbitration (though the operational design of
arbitration does promote inconsistency);446 rather, inconsistencies in
jurisprudence are a substantive necessity no matter the institutional
design chosen for the structuring of supernational transactions
between states and foreign non-state actors, due to the
incommensurable interests involved.447
Thus, supernational law posits that inconsistencies in the
jurisprudence are a symptom of the necessarily incommensurable
interests underlying the transactions themselves. The complex,
cooperative, and contextual nature of supernational intercourse
requires that the ultimate decision in a dispute be formulated in terms
of the reference points of international or transnational good faith.448
These reference points themselves are, of necessity, inconsistent
because they aim to meet different constitutive values, namely
commonweal and commercial profit.44 9  Balancing such
incommensurate values will necessarily lead to facially inconsistent
decisions, depending on how the balance between the values was
ultimately struck in light of the factual make up of each case.450 As the
analysis is heavily contextual, abstraction from context will likely lose
the regard given to incongruent concerns raised by the losing party.451
The arbitral process of decision making thus does not distort the law
or "rig" the decision;45 2 rather, it reflects the balancing of the
incommensurate but entangled reliance interests of both state and
commercial actors.453
VII. CONCLUSION: THE VALUE OF SUPERNATIONAL LAW
This Article, so far, has focused on retheorizing these
supernational legal processes to avoid the pitfalls of existing
approaches to investor-state arbitration. The framework developed
overcomes the internal incoherence of existing approaches and points
out how existing processes overcome the apparent asymmetries in
investor-state arbitration. There is, however, one remaining question:
What is the independent value that makes supernational legal
processes worth pursuing?
446. See Sourgens, supra note 434, at 224-44.
447. See Sunstein, supra note 429, at 856-59 (discussing incommensurability).
448. See supra Parts III-1V.
449. See id.
450. See Alexandrov, supra note 311, at 205.
451. See id.
452. But see Warren, supra note 1.
453. See supra Part III.
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A. Depolitization
The most significant constitutive value of international economic
law identified in the literature is depolitization.454 The history of
international trade is replete with armed interventions as a means to
resolve trade and investment disputes.455 The current infrastructure
for the resolution of investor-state disputes arose directly out of such
aborted armed interventions: France and the United Kingdom invaded
Egypt following Egypt's nationalization of the Suez Canal;456 the
United States refused to support the intervention and the dispute
between the shareholders in the Suez Canal Company and Egypt was
resolved by the President of the World Bank.45 7 In light of this
experience, the World Bank negotiated and adopted the ICSID
Convention, discussed in more detail in Part IV, Sections B and D. 45 8
It is fair to surmise then that, in the absence of legal processes to
resolve large scale natural resource disputes, these disputes would
have been resolved by more traditional foreign policy means.459
Although it is, by and large, unlikely that they would have led to armed
interventions to protect expropriated assets, such disputes would
probably have been resolved by sheer political and economic might.460
A pattern of settlements on political terms would then have become
part of the expectation of the global community. The resolution of
disputes in such a manner, however, would seriously undermine the
authority of legal institutions in the global community.46 1
This Article applies and expands upon this depolitization
rationale. First, supernational law is a theory of how law supplants
force462 because decisions are made by reference to legal principles
rather than sheer physical or economic might.463 But, supernational
law also deepens the depolitization rationale: it supplies an
independent source of authority for supernational legal processes.464 A
decision is authoritative if its rationale follows the expectations process
454. See Bjorklund et al., supra note 40; MONTT, supra note 25, at 370-74; see
generally Sergio Puig, Recasting ICSID's Legitimacy Debate: Towards a Goal-Based
Empirical Agenda, 36 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 465, 495-98 (2013) (evaluating and
providing a framework for critiquing the claim that the ICSID, through depolitization,
balances power between unequal states); Roberts 2015, supra note 26, at 388-95.
455. See MONTT, supra note 25, at 36-38; see generally TODD WEILER, THE
INTERPRETATION OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: EQUALITY, DISCRIMINATION, AND
MINIMUM STANDARDS OF TREATMENT IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT 115-28 (2013).
456. See ANTONIO R. PARRA, THE HISTORY OF ICSID 23 (2012).
457. See id. at 23-24.
458. See id. at 23-24, 94.
459. See DUGAN ET AL., supra note 21, at 8 (addressing diplomatic protection).
460. See id.
461. See REISMAN, supra note 43, at 101 (discussing dysfunctional operational
codes).
462. See Bjorklund et al., supra note 40.
463. See id.
464. See LASSWELL & MCDOUGAL, supra note 28, at 26 (defining authority).
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participants have in legal decision making more generally.465 This
Article showcases how decision processes predictably anchor decision
making in the reasonable expectations state and commercial parties
have based on the larger liability rules governing their own respective
behavior.466 Decisions thus are not authoritative because they were
made by arbitrators empowered to resolve them-a rationale that is
itself "political" if the institutions making decisions have been
captured46 7-but rather are authoritative because they are in keeping
with the expectations process participants have of legal process more
generally.4 68
In other words, depolitization is more than mere myth.4 6 9 What
drives decision is not unbridled (i.e., "political") arbitrator
discretion.470 Arbitrator discretion is guided by an operational balance
of international and transnational interests.471 This operational code
of arbitral decision making may not always be readily apparent on the
face of a tribunal's reasoning472 but emerges when this reasoning is
placed in the context of the sections of an award summarizing party
submissions.473 As such, supernational aw explains how international
economic law remains actually authoritative despite the supposed
shortcomings of dispute resolution. Quite contrary to current
criticisms, this operational overlap between community expectations
and actual decision outcome supports the claim that arbitration is in
fact healthy and robust rather than rigged or corrupt.474
Second, supernational law moves away from the dispute-based
paradigm underlying much of the literature. This Article thus
contributes to the growing literature that provides a means of
strengthening transactional processes of cooperation between states
and commercial actors.4 75 This Article identifies principles that inform
465. Id.
466. See supra Parts III-IV.
467. See KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 199, at 589.
468. See supra Parts III-IV (detailing the unilateral act and transnational good
faith elements of supernational aw).
469. See REISMAN, supra note 43, at 95-104 (distinguishing myth from
operational code).
470. See SOURGENS, supra note 27, at 123-38 (describing the role of discretion in
the arbitral decision process).
471. See supra Parts III-IV.
472. SOURGENS, supra note 27, at 215-20.
473. See id.
474. See REISMAN, supra note 43, at 101-03 (warning of operational codes that
"may be profoundly dysfunctional, serving only to protect the entrenched position of
elites or particular groups, for example, allowing rewards to be granted on the basis of
'old-boy' crony contacts or class, gender, caste, tribal, or ethnic ties rather the
performance merit prescribed by the myth system." Such dysfunction is minimized
when the operational code "secure[s] greater and greater realization of many of those
values" at the heart of the myth system constitutive of community expectations.).
475. See DESIERTO, supra note 225, at 373-76, 382.
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the rights and obligations of both state and commercial entities.476 In
doing so, it assists in avoiding the germination or escalation of disputes
by providing a cooperative paradigm that could be used in transaction
design, renegotiations of failed settlements, conciliation, or
mediation.477 It thus depoliticizes disputes by providing a collaborative
roadmap to prevent them.
B. Repolitization
The second constitutive value of supernational legal processes is
the appropriate repolitization of decision. A potential flaw of
depolitization is the possible assumption that law and politics are
fundamentally distinct: legal science is concerned with the derivation
of pure results from abstract axioms.478 It thus places the decision fully
beyond the reach of politics. 479
A full depolitization of law, however, is not logically tenable. Any
proposed "pure" or apolitical conception of law still favors certain
distributive value outcomes over others.480 These distributive
outcomes are, by their very nature, political in that they actually
constitute just one possible distribution of value rather than the only
conceivable distribution of value.481 In simple terms, the law makes
winners and losers; a pure conception of law determines who wins and
who loses, not why winners should win and losers should lose.482 The
choice of distributive paradigms imposed by legal decision is beyond
any purely legal analysis.483 Advocating "purely" legal solutions to
distributive problems thus tends to justify deeply political choices as
formally legal ones by sleight of hand.484 The critique of international
economic law, unsurprisingly, draws attention to this problem:4 85 it
bitingly regards international legal instruments as quasi-colonial
476. See supra Part VI (combining the unilateral act state liability and
transnational investor liability elements of supernational aw into a single process of
decision).
477. See Susan D. Franck, Integrating Investment Treaty Conflict and Dispute
Systems Design, 92 MINN. L. REV. 161, 196-201 (2007) (discussing first-tier dispute
resolution and its problems); DESIERTO, supra note 225, at 373-76, 382.
478. See LASSWELL & MCDOUGAL, supra note 28, at 106-07.
479. See id.
480. See Franck & Wylie, supra note 11, at 494-97 (analyzing investment treaty
arbitration outcomes).
481. See KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 199, at 589 (discussing the "political"
element of international law).
482. See LASSWELL & MCDOUGAL, supra note 28, at 107-08.
483. See generally id.
484. See KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 199, at 589 (discussing the "political"
element of international law).
485. See M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT
305 (2010); VAN HARTEN, supra note 91, at 174-75.
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politics propagated by the tip of a pen rather than the barrel of a
gun.486
To be desirable and to have authority, supernational aw must not
divorce law from policy. 487 It submits instead that supernational egal
processes are authoritative because they take seriously the policy
concerns of the state, as well as those of the commercial
counterparty.488 The values of commonweal and sustainable
profitability are central to the supernational decision-making process
because of the broadly contextual approach to decision making it
adopts.489 These values are deeply political because they mediate
between different conceptions of political economy, from libertarian
regard for property to social democratic concerns for the broader
distributive repercussions of unbridled competition.490
Put differently, supernational legal processes create legal rights
and obligations because of the entangled reliance interests created by
global investment flows. 491 These reliance interests make sense
because the state and the investor seek to create collaborative
advantages neither could achieve on its own.492 It is the difference in
their interests that permits the collaborative advantages to
materialize.493 Thus they each must pay heed to the interests of the
counterparty to achieve their own end.494 By placing this collaborative
rationale at the heart of the decision-making process, supernational
law makes the policy motivations of both actors relevant to legal
decision. It embraces the policy needs of host states as a core operative
piece of its decision-making process.
Supernational law does not blindly impose quasi-colonial politics
under the guise of legal documents.495 Its prescriptions are premised
in the reasonable reliance interests created by supernational
cooperation. Understanding the specific content of such prescription
requires an appraisal of the policy implications of the international
investment flows in question. This appraisal balances the policy goals
of the state against the interests of commercial actors as an instrument
to their achievement. It is only following such an appraisal that
486. See MONTT, supra note 25, at 370 (discussing the potential of gunboat
arbitration).
487. See LASSWELL & McDOUGAL, supra note 28, at 26 (defining authority).
488. See supra Parts III-IV.
489. See id.
490. See Wenhua Shan, From "North-South Divide" to "Private-Public Debate"
Revival of the Calvo Doctrine and the Changing Landscape in International Investment
Law, 27 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 631, 654 (2007) (discussing the possible political
economies of investment law).
491. See supra Part V.
492. See id.
493. See FISHER & URY, supra note 219.
494. See supra Part V.
495. See MONTT, supra note 25, at 370.
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supernational prescriptions can be applied to a specific dispute, be it
in an arbitral award, or in a more informal mediation or conciliation.
Supernational aw thus explains why legal decision making in its
field of application is desirable for the host state. Decision making in
matters central to a state's wellbeing is not subject to ad hoc military,
political, or economic pressure, as it might otherwise be.496 Decision
making further comports with the expectations that states have of
legal process more generally.497 But decision making still takes
seriously the host-state's policy goals for international investment
flows and integrates these goals within the legal decision-making
process.498 It imposes the same kind of obligation on the state and the
foreign investor and protects mutual interests rather than unilateral
interest.499 Far from rigged, supernational legal processes are fully
operationally and cognitively open.
C. The Allocation Function of Commercial Risks and Responsibilities
If supernational law is beneficial to host states, it is a natural
inclination to think that it stands to the detriment of commercial
actors. It is typical to view international legal decision as a zero-sum
game where whatever favors the host state must. be commercially
disadvantageous. From this perspective, supernational law would
prove commercially unpalatable. The perception that international
investment law is a zero-sum game is premised in a dispute-based
paradigm.50 0 Because much of the legal material on international
investment arises out of disputes, legal scholarship frequently tracks
the contentious mode underlying these materials.50 1 This zero-sum-
game mentality is puzzling, however, because investment flows in
particular are considered to lead to positive gains for all involved.502
Commercial interests, in fact, are best served if a zero-sum-game
approach is abandoned;50 3 commercial actors enter into transactions to
see them come to fruition not to litigate disputes arising under them.
If all commercial transactions were zero-sum games, incentive for
breach of contract would be high, as any future change to deal
496. See generally Bjorklund et al., supra note 40.
497. See supra Part IV.
498. See id.
499. See id.
500. See generally Franck & Wylie, supra note 11, at 494-97 (analyzing
investment treaty arbitration outcomes).
501. See supra Part I.
502. See Stephen M. De Luca, Historical Retrospective and the Future Role and
Jurisdiction of the U.S. Court of International Trade in the New Millennium, 26
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 801, 810 (2001) ("The international trade regime was based on





parameters would bring about the conditions for an efficient breach. 504
One party could achieve more value by defecting from the transaction
than remaining in it. 0 5 If, however, transactions generate value for
both parties, there is an incentive for cooperation even in the context
of changed circumstances. Logically, commercial actors would only be
willing or able to enter into short-term transactions under a zero-sum-
game paradigm because of the risk of adverse market changes. As
investment contracts are the exact opposite of short-term investment-
often running for a quarter century or more-investment would seem
a commercially silly enterprise if commercial actors considered these
transactions to be zero-sum games.
In order to achieve value-added benefits, the law must assist in
assigning commercial risks and responsibilities. Commercial actors
must be able to price transactions to determine whether the rate of
return presented by an opportunity is adequate and sustainable for
their business. To make such a calculation, commercial actors use legal
instruments to assign risk. As not every situation can be anticipated
in the contractual instruments, commercial actors rely on the
underlying applicable law in order to fill the gaps for any unforeseen
issues.
Supernational law assists commercial actors in generating
positive value because it provides a clearly identifiable process for
decision making. This process imposes obligations on commercial
actors premised on commercial practice.506 It thus permits commercial
actors to make efficient predictions of their own exposure.50 7 This
process further grants rights to commercial actors that significantly
limit country risk.5 08 This limitation is not absolute, nor would a
commercial actor expect it to be, given the recognition of country risk
in almost every force majeure clause in international commerce.50 9 But,
it does create a reasonable window for economic cooperation with a
state actor: the state can be expected to keep its word in good faith
because failure to do so leads to enforceable liability consequences.
The benefit of a supernational law conception of international
economic relations is its ultimate simplicity. It is anchored in an
understanding of good faith. When parties with fundamentally
different interests and experiences transact with each other, they must
confront the fact that they will each create reliance interests in the
other. These reliance interests will combine to create sustainable
cooperative enterprises when each side gives due regard to the policy
504. For a fuller theoretical discussion of efficient breach and cooperative
rationality, see Fr6d6ric G. Sourgens, Reason and Reasonableness: The Necessary
Diversity of the Common Law, 67 ME. L. REV. 73, 113-16 (2014).
505. See id.
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interests of the other. Failing that, future transactions will be
encouraged if the disputes are resolved with an eye to the value of the
cross-entanglement of mutual reliance interests. Supernational law
achieves both because it takes seriously the incommensurability of the
interests of supernational actors and conceives of law as their
intermediation rather than as the imposition of one set of interests as
supreme.
